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In litigation days of old, American courts jealously guarded their procedural 
powers through the doctrine of “ouster” and blocked most litigant efforts to 
create their own private procedural landscape. By the end of the twentieth 
century, the ouster doctrine was gone. Litigants now use an increasingly 
sophisticated set of contractual agreements that alter or displace standard 
procedural rules, a practice known as “private procedural ordering.” But this 
is not to say that judicial power has been displaced. In fact, the downfall of 
traditional ouster doctrine was accompanied by a rise in the scope and use of 
judicial discretion in procedural matters, culminating in the emergence of the 
“managerial judge” with administrative powers and responsibilities that would 
have seemed entirely foreign to a modern judge’s earlier counterpart. 
This Article examines the link between the scope of judicial discretion and the 
acceptance (or even endorsement and encouragement) of private procedural 
ordering. Examples from civil procedure demonstrate the varying relationship 
dynamics between judicial discretion and private procedural ordering, from the 
uneasy compatibility found in the rules of discovery to the outright clash of 
values in the enforcement of forum selection clauses. 
The relationship between judicial discretion and private procedural ordering 
is not coincidental. Rather, it reveals that the civil litigation landscape is one in 
which litigants are “co-managers” of litigation alongside the increasingly 
“managerial” judges. More controversially, this relationship also shows that 
litigants are “co-interpreters” of procedural rules alongside judges, sharing the 
authority to shape the contours of the meaning, scope, and application of many 
procedural rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
We are living in an era of robust privatized procedure. Arbitration and other 
private dispute resolution forums provide a complete exit from the procedure 
and personnel of the public courts. But even parties that remain in the federal or 
state courts have access to an increasingly sophisticated set of contractual tools 
that allow them to shape, change, and even opt out of many of the courts’ rules 
of practice and procedure. 
In an earlier era, these practices were almost always forbidden, blocked by 
various manifestations of the “ouster” doctrine, which provided that parties may 
not “oust” the power or jurisdiction of a court by means of a private agreement. 
By the mid-twentieth century, the “ouster” doctrine had all but fallen away. 
Today, parties have become even more aggressive in their attempts to impose 
private or “bespoke” procedural rules on dispute resolution in public courts. This 
is known as “private procedural ordering,” sometimes referred to as “contract 
procedure,” “party agreement,” or “party preference.” The fall of ouster 
doctrine, however, should not be conflated with a displacement of judicial 
power. At the same time that parties began to flex their contractual procedural 
muscle, judges assumed a new and powerful managerial role accompanied by a 
broad scope of discretion for many procedural decisions. 
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In the recent decades of civil procedure scholarship, much has been written 
about both phenomena: the rise of private procedural ordering,1 and the changing 
nature of procedural discretion.2 Few scholars, however, have ventured a more 
 
1 See, e.g., H. Allen Blair, Promise and Peril: Doctrinally Permissible Options for 
Calibrating Procedure Through Contract, 95 NEB. L. REV. 787, 816-17 (2017) (noting that 
courts have gradually given parties more and more freedom to “tailor process and 
procedure”); Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1, 3-4 (2014) (stating that private parties “stand at the apex of the litigation hierarchy” with 
the law and courts below them); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation 
Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1475 
(2013) (“The practice of parties agreeing on the procedures that will govern the resolution of 
their dispute is an inherent characteristic of various private mechanisms for dispute 
resolution . . . .”); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1793 (2014) 
[hereinafter Resnik, The Privatization of Process] (noting how “new procedural forms close 
off public access by sitting dispute resolution outside the public sphere”); W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 
1871-72 (2015) (discussing how parties “alter the background rules of litigation”); see also 
Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
507, 507 (2011) (“Judicial decisions of public courts increasingly are based on ‘contract 
procedure,’ private rules of procedure that the parties draft and assent to before a 
dispute . . . has arisen.”); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 723, 731 (2011) (concurring that procedural private ordering “affords parties 
substantial latitude in altering procedure”); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The 
Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 462 (2007) 
(noticing that courts today accommodate great magnitude of private choices); Henry S. 
Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in 
Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 581 (2007) (examining “limits on 
parties’ ability to design and implement through contractual agreements their own set of 
public dispute resolution”); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
593, 594 (2005) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedure as Contract] (discussing whether parties 
should contract for jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and privacy as part of contract procedure); 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 814, 821 (2006) (discussing how parties can further improve benefits of “trading off front-
end and back-end costs” by modifying procedural rules); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, 
Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public 
Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1085-87 (2002) 
(discussing how pre-litigation agreements have redefined portions of public system); 
Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 181-82 (highlighting policy 
implications of “designer trial” and its intersections with freedom of contract). 
2 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal 
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1989) 
[hereinafter Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute] (accounting historical evolution of 
civil procedure); Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1971-75 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, Who Decides?] (introducing 
history of procedural discretion); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly 
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sustained inquiry into the connection between these two trends. This Article 
joins a nascent scholarly discussion that situates private procedural ordering 
within the larger context of litigation administration and the role of judges 
therein, with a particular focus on the role of judicial discretion.3 
The scope of judicial discretion and the acceptance (or even endorsement and 
encouragement) of private procedural ordering are linked in many 
circumstances. In these instances, the amount of judicial discretion over the 
interpretation and application of procedural rules is related to the rulemakers’ 
understanding of how much control litigants and other private parties can or 
should have over the litigation process. Rulemakers and courts consciously 
deploy the tools of judicial discretion and private party agreement. In some 
instances, rulemakers make a deliberate choice to employ them as 
complementary tools. In other circumstances, judicial discretion and party 
agreement are treated as clashing, or perhaps even mutually exclusive, values in 
which only one can emerge victorious. 
Part II illustrates the relationship between judicial discretion and private 
procedural ordering by introducing examples from the rules regarding civil 
discovery and judicial involvement in settlement. In each of these instances, 
rulemakers have explicitly tied a broad scope of judicial discretion to the 
assumption (and even promotion) of party agreement. I then examine the 
enforcement of forum selection clauses to demonstrate a situation in which party 
agreements concluded outside of the scope of litigation can affect courts’ 
understanding of judicial discretion. Here, the narrowing (and in some situations 
disappearing) scope of judicial discretion in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfers and 
forum non conveniens dismissals can be linked directly to an almost obsessive 
judicial focus on the existence of party agreement to the exclusion of judicial 
discretion—a value written into the text of § 1404(a) itself. 
I then suggest three potential theories to explain the linkage between judicial 
discretion and private procedural ordering. The “Elevation Theory” posits that 
in recent decades judges and other rulemakers have put such a high premium on 
private procedural ordering that this concept trumps other principles, including 
broad judicial discretion. The “Co-Management Theory” suggests that the link 
between judicial discretion and private procedural ordering is not symptomatic 
 
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2069-74 (1989) (examining legislative background of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in 
Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683, 698-701 (2014) (discussing intersection of regulation 
and discretion in general); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and 
Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1972-81 (1989) (revisiting legislative 
history of Rule 16). 
3 Professor Dodson’s recent work has addressed this relationship. Dodson, supra note 1, 
at 7 (discussing how courts retain “largely unfettered discretion—cabined only by law—to 
disregard or override” parties’ choices in respect to litigation decisions). I respond directly to 
many of Dodson’s claims in Section III.A of this Article. 
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of a preference for contract procedure, but rather, is an expression of a desire to 
have litigants be “co-managers” of litigation alongside the increasingly 
“managerial” judges. The “Co-Interpretive Theory” theorizes that a world in 
which there is a dynamic relationship between the availability of private 
procedural ordering and judicial discretion is one in which many rules of civil 
procedure are subject to interpretation and development by judges and litigants 
together. When private procedural ordering and judicial discretion occur in 
conjunction within the outer boundaries of permissibility as expressed in the 
rules, the push and pull of both phenomena develop and delineate the content of 
the rules themselves. I conclude by suggesting that the “Co-Management” and 
“Co-Interpretive” theories together are the most plausible account of the 
relationship between private procedural ordering and judicial discretion. 
I. THE RISE OF PRIVATE PROCEDURAL ORDERING MEETS 
THE WORLD OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Procedural rules provide the framework under which disputes will be settled. 
The rules for public litigation come from a wide variety of sources, the most 
obvious of which are public and of non-litigant specific provenance: state and 
federal legislatures, administrative rules committees, local court systems, and 
individual judges who have chamber-specific procedures. Beyond this 
framework, the parties to a lawsuit in American litigation have always exerted a 
good degree of control over litigation and its rules.4 
Although this state of affairs is not particularly new, the phenomenon has 
received heavier scholarly scrutiny in recent years. Parties have, with varying 
degrees of success, made choices that result in deviations from existing 
procedural rules or created new procedures or rules altogether. These choices 
can be unilateral or by agreement and can take place before the existence of a 
dispute or during the life of an existing lawsuit. These practices have come to be 
known under a few different names: “contract procedure,”5 “party choice,”6 
 
4 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9 (2001) 
(describing strong and unique commitment to party control of litigation in American system); 
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2012) (noting that private parties enjoy “wide latitude” of choices 
outside general procedural rules and judicial decisions). 
5 See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 1, at 511 (defining “contract procedure” as “practice 
of setting out procedures in contracts to govern disputes that have not yet arisen, but that will 
be adjudicated in the public courts when they do arise”); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 
supra note 1, at 626 (outlining analytical questions specific to contract procedure). 
6 See Bone, supra note 4, at 1330 (discussing “party choice” as another source of 
procedure). 
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“party preference,”7 “privatized procedure,”8 and “procedural private 
ordering.”9 In this Article, I refer to these practices collectively as “private 
procedural ordering” because that label best captures the wide range of conduct 
in which it is the actions of specific private parties, not those of public 
rulemakers or judges, who create or alter the procedures for dispute resolution. 
Private procedural ordering can affect choice of forum and personal 
jurisdiction,10 applicable substantive law,11 the timing and scope of discovery,12 
attorneys’ fees,13 and even the question of whether a case will be litigated in a 
public court at all instead of a private tribunal.14 To take a simple example, a 
party who is not otherwise subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction may 
 
7 See generally Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 675 (2015). 
8 See David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 391 
(stating that privatized procedure is hot scholarly topic). 
9 See Dodge, supra note 1, at 724 (describing expanded power of procedural contracts); 
Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 514 (2009) (discussing “private ordering” in procedure). 
10 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (verifying that choice of 
forum clause in consumer contract is enforceable); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1, 6 (1972) (noting that choice of forum clause in commercial contract is enforceable 
and “should rarely be disturbed”). The two cases also stand for the proposition that a valid 
and enforceable forum selection clause also constitutes consent to the personal jurisdiction of 
the chosen court. 
11 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 458-63 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing principles of choice-of-law clause 
enforceability). 
12 Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 1, at 1476 (observing that parties can enter pre-dispute 
agreements to stipulate scope of discovery). 
13 Rhee, supra note 9, at 562-68 (discussing private agreements for allocation of attorneys’ 
fees). 
14 See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343-44 (2011) (holding that 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts state laws that find arbitration class action waivers 
unconscionable); Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664 (2010) 
(citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989)) (finding that FAA’s central purpose is to “ensure that ‘private agreements to arbitrate 
are enforced according to their terms’”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985) (holding that parties can contract for resolution of 
public law claims, including antitrust claims, in arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 669-72 (2001) (describing and critiquing enforcement of 
arbitration clauses); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other 
Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 188-97 
(2004) (explaining how forum selection clauses can waive constitutional rights through form 
contract). 
  
2018] OUSTED 133 
 
consent to its jurisdiction.15 Although parties may alter a broad range of 
procedural rules, some rules lie beyond the reach of party preference; the most 
prominent example of this is the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.16 
Some procedural rules may be waived or altered at any time, including prior to 
the existence of a lawsuit or even during a dispute. Others may only be waived 
after the initiation of litigation. Commentators refer to this distinction as ex ante 
versus ex post waiver or alteration of procedural rules.17 
In recent years, the elevation and enforcement of party preference in litigation 
rules have come under increasing scholarly scrutiny. Some scholars support a 
robust regime of procedural contracting,18 while others caution that its use is 
already too expansive,19 and that total exit to arbitration allows parties to “create 
an alternative procedural universe.”20 Commentators have noted a strong uptick 
in the number of procedures that appear to be available to party modification or 
waiver,21 although not all agree that party preference is as dominant as some 
 
15 See Bone, supra note 4, at 1345-47 (describing legal status of agreements to limit 
discovery both before and after commencement of litigation). 
16 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 420 (1911) 
(highlighting that defects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived). 
17 See Bone, supra note 4, at 1339-42 (categorizing party-made procedure in four different 
types); Dodge, supra note 1, passim (discussing ex ante procedural contracts); see also Blair, 
supra note 1, at 789-93 (documenting advantages of pre-procedural and post-procedural 
contracting); Matthew A. Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) (describing ex post policing strategy of many procedural rules). 
18 See Moffitt, supra note 1, at 462 (arguing that “current set of procedural rules should be 
treated as default rules, rather than as nonnegotiable parameters”); Noyes, supra note 1, at 
621 (arguing that public litigation with modifiable rules is often preferable to public litigation 
with fixed rules as well as arbitration); Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 821-22 (describing 
how efficiency gains can be improved by using contract to vary procedural rules that will 
apply to dispute). 
19 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 1, at 725 (“The conversion of procedural rules from publicly 
created, mandatory guarantors of procedural justice to default rules subject to market forces 
alters the nature and function of civil procedure at a basic level.”); J. Maria Glover, 
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3052 (2015) 
(discussing how expansion of private arbitration has negatively shielded cases from “judicial 
and public scrutiny”); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of 
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (criticizing widespread use 
of arbitration agreements); see also Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 1, at 517-20 (noting that 
there is insufficient empirical data to draw concrete conclusions on how widespread use of 
contract procedure has been). 
20 David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 460 (2011). 
21 See, e.g., Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 1, at 510-11 (listing procedural tools subject to 
potential contractual modification); Dodge, supra note 1, at 734-38 (describing rise in “private 
procedural ordering”). 
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scholars have claimed.22 Even scholars who note that parties have been slow to 
adopt pre-dispute procedural customizations argue that “the current trend of 
doctrine could not be clearer: courts seem ready to enforce parties’ autonomous 
procedural choices.”23 
Scholars skeptical of private procedural ordering have leveled several 
criticisms against this trend. One of the oldest arguments raised is that enforcing 
such agreements “ousts” the power of the trial court and trial judge.24 Modern 
critics see a newer form of ouster, in which private procedural ordering deprives 
a judge of the opportunity to apply uniform rules of procedure and case 
management, and deprives the forum of its ability to promulgate and “sell” a 
coherent package of procedural rules.25 As the older ouster doctrine lost its force, 
arguments against privatized procedure were recast into a broader unease that 
the enforcement of private procedural agreements would lead to the 
displacement of the public judicial function. These policy-centered arguments 
suggest that, even if enforcing arbitration agreements or privatized procedure in 
public courts does not formally oust a court of its power, such enforcement 
nonetheless inflicts damage on the system of public dispute resolution as a whole 
due to a lack of transparency,26 lack of common law development, and a threat 
to judicial legitimacy and integrity.27 
Private procedural ordering displaces the decisions of rulemakers (usually a 
legislature or rulemaking committee) and the decision-making authority of 
judges.28 The concern over altering rules centers around a clash between public 
and private values. Critics contend that publicly promulgated rules represent 
public values that protect individual participants in a dispute and balance the 
 
22 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 6-7 (arguing that party agreements are subordinate to 
judicial authority and power of law). 
23 Blair, supra note 1, at 791. 
24 Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 450 (1874) (holding that individual cannot 
“bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced . . . to forfeit 
his rights at all times and on all occasions”). This older form of ouster doctrine has largely 
fallen out of favor. 
25 Jaime Dodge refers to this as “unbundled procedure.” Dodge, supra note 1, at 744. 
26 See Glover, supra note 19, at 3055-56 (describing loss of transparency in shift to 
widespread dispute resolution in arbitration). 
27 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 4, at 1378-80 (arguing that critics of party rulemaking should 
“ground their arguments in a theory of adjudicative legitimacy”); Davis & Hershkoff, supra 
note 1, at 556-63 (discussing lack of information disclosure as fallout of private procedural 
ordering); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 1, at 597-98 (“Questions of legitimacy 
and fairness . . . need to be redirected towards bargaining processes promoted by courts, 
agencies, Congress, and private providers.”). 
28 Horton, supra note 20, at 442 (noting that FAA “does not just allow private parties to 
engage in lawmaking—it allows them to engage in law revision, abrogating Congress’s 
procedural rulemaking duties and eroding substantive statutory and common law rights”). 
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competing values of efficiency in litigation and accuracy in outcomes.29 
Although parties have always been able to deviate from these rules in certain 
instances, private procedural ordering suggests an “inversion” of the typical 
inquiry in which “no longer is the primary question how the public rules 
structure should be designed to protect the private individual’s interest from 
public intrusion; instead, the question is what restrictions upon party-driven 
procedure must be incorporated to protect the public interest.”30 
Another worry is that private procedural ordering diminishes the fundamental 
essence of public litigation. If parties were truly free to customize procedures to 
their liking, there would be little difference between litigation in a public forum 
and private arbitration.31 To the extent that public tribunals are charged with 
enforcing substantive law, some uniform baseline of procedure and transparent 
reasoning must exist to distinguish public adjudication from private dispute 
resolution.32 In other words, too much privatized procedure would transform the 
public courts into little more than publicly available arbitral tribunals.33 Adjacent 
to this criticism is the concern that procedural alterations or resolution via 
arbitration can change the nature of the underlying substantive rights about 
which the parties are litigating.34 In the most extreme situations, procedural rules 
 
29 Dodge, supra note 1, at 748-50 (observing that private ordering could cause risk 
asymmetry and not necessarily enhance “the efficiency or accuracy of truth-finding”); Taylor 
& Cliffe, supra note 1, at 1099-1100 (arguing that privatized procedure may violate 
constitutional principle of separation of powers and, as policy matter, deprives deliberative 
bodies, such as Congress or Rules Advisory Committee, of opportunity to publicly debate and 
craft procedural rules). 
30 Dodge, supra note 1, at 765. Dodge focuses her critique on whether it is acceptable to 
classify and honor ex ante procedural alterations in the same way that courts have done with 
ex post modifications. Id. at 765-70. But see Bone, supra note 4, at 1333-34 (questioning 
whether it is possible to quantify and compare costs and benefits to procedural rules and 
alterations). 
31 See Bone, supra note 4, at 1385-86 (explaining that, at its core, arbitration focuses on 
dispute resolution whereas adjudication focuses on principled reasoning). 
32 Id. at 1387; Glover, supra note 19, at 3056-57 (“[T]he shift from dispute resolution in 
courts, the public realm, to dispute resolution in arbitration, the private realm . . . threatens 
both the transparency and mechanisms of lawmaking.”). 
33 This is true even if one adopts a primarily “dispute resolution” model for public 
litigation rather than a “norm-creation” or public law model. 
34 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-37 (1958) (discussing 
issue of applicable law in worker’s compensation case); Dodge, supra note 1, at 771 
(“[U]nlike most ex post procedural contracts, permitting ex ante modification allows parties 
to affect deterrence by affirmatively changing the expected average outcomes in the 
compliance and non-compliance states at the time of performance.”). This argument relies on 
the close relationship between procedure and substance and the recognition that the mode of 
enforcing a right can alter its value or even its existence. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511 (1995) 
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can be so costly that they effectively erase a plaintiff’s ability to bring a claim.35 
This is most notable in the class action waiver context. Many small claims are 
only viable if brought as a class action.36 When a party utilizes a class action 
waiver in an ex ante contract, it can effectively insulate itself from liability by 
making a lawsuit nigh impossible to launch. Thus, although a substantive right 
may exist in theory, it has been all but eliminated in practice.37 
One of the biggest criticisms of private procedural ordering is that the 
agreements to limit procedure or opt out completely via arbitration are a result 
of unfair bargaining power between the parties. Therefore, according to this 
argument, these agreements do not reflect a state of affairs in which each party 
has meaningfully consented to procedural alterations. These concerns are most 
pronounced in the consumer context of contracts of adhesion and collective 
bargaining agreements, and special scholarly attention has been focused on 
arbitration agreements.38 
 
(finding that change of venue within federal system—a system of supposedly uniform practice 
and procedure—led to decrease from fifty-eight percent to twenty-nine percent in success by 
plaintiffs). A jury-trial waiver can drastically reduce the recovery of punitive damages, see 
Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration for 
Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer 
Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 122 (2008) (arguing that firms utilize jury-trial waivers and 
aggregate claims in order to “avoid the risk of a large damage award” or avoid liability 
completely), and reduce liability in employment discrimination cases by up to ninety percent 
of the time, see id. at 121 (finding arbitration clause in ninety percent of employment 
contracts); Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain for Employers 
over Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 91, 96 (2009) (finding that 
ninety percent of employment discrimination cases that reach court are decided by jury). 
35 See Glover, supra note 19, at 3057 (noticing that arbitration using certain procedural 
rules can “have the foreseeable, indeed possibly intended, consequence of preventing certain 
claims from being asserted at all, rendering those claims mere nullities” (footnote omitted)). 
36 See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1066 
(2012) (“By assigning collective ownership of the claims to class counsel, the class action 
equalizes the stakes, thereby giving the class . . . the same incentives to invest in common 
issues as the defendant.”). 
37 See Bone, supra note 4, at 1368 (“[T]he problem in Concepcion was that the class waiver 
eliminated the most effective device for aggregating individual claims and attracting lawyers 
to serve as private attorneys general to enforce deterrence goals.”); Dodge, supra note 1, at 
778-80 (“[T]o the extent that an ex ante class waiver is offered, an individual anticipating that 
others will prefer an upfront payment . . . will feel pressure to opt out . . . .”). 
38 See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55, 72-74 (2004) (discussing impacts of mandatory arbitration clauses vis-à-vis 
consumer protection); Horton, supra note 20, at 451-60 (describing decline of 
unconscionability as defense to arbitration clauses and rise of unilateral imposition of 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648-58 (2005) (examining attacks and 
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Not all commentary on private procedural ordering has been negative. Some 
scholars have argued that party-made rules are more efficient than broadly 
applicable publicly drafted rules.39 Others have suggested that private 
procedural ordering lessens the incentive for parties to forego public litigation 
at all in favor of arbitration.40 Scholars have also countered the concerns over 
inequality in bargaining power by relying on traditional arguments of party 
autonomy and freedom of contract.41 Most importantly, a good deal of the 
criticism about private procedural ordering has focused on agreements made 
outside of litigation, or on the problems inherent in opting out in favor of 
arbitration. As I shall illustrate later, party agreement is already baked into some 
of our existing procedural tools. Understanding why and how this might be 
favorable could lead to a more nuanced evaluation of the larger problem of 
private procedural ordering. 
Whereas private procedural ordering has been treated as a relatively new 
phenomenon by commentators in the past three decades, scholarly conversations 
about judicial discretion are well-worn. The basic question about how much 
latitude judges have to interpret and apply rules extends far beyond civil 
procedure.42 Judicial discretion refers to the permissibility of a judge to reach 
any number of equally acceptable outcomes when deciding a legal question or 
 
defenses of mandatory arbitration); see generally Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts 
Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (2002) (discussing 
evolution of mandatory binding arbitration in United States). Moreover, to the extent that 
these arguments are persuasive, they tend to have more to say about the state of modern 
contract doctrine than about issues particular to civil procedure. 
39 See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 802-13 (explaining gains from procedural 
customization); Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 1, at 1475-76 (suggesting that private 
agreements on procedural issues could help reduce costs, lower risks, and promote fair 
outcomes); Moffitt, supra note 1, at 465 (arguing that “risks and uncertainties involved with 
the customization experiment would be manageable” and that “its enormous potential benefits 
make customization imperative for the future of litigation”); Rhee, supra note 9, at 566 
(“Private ordering of a dispute is achieved when the parties are allowed to rearrange the 
procedural rules governing public adjudication of the dispute so as to reach an efficient result 
at the lowest individual and social cost. Because procedural rules can impose significant costs 
and risks on the parties, some rules should be subject to reordering by the parties.”). 
40 See Moffitt, supra note 1, at 490-91 (arguing that customization allows sophisticated 
parties to “recraft the litigation experience in a way that makes it more attractive”); Noyes, 
supra note 1, at 594 (“If ex ante contracts to modify the rules of litigation are enforceable, 
then contractually-modified litigation offers a superior alternative to arbitration.”). 
41 See Moffitt, supra note 1, at 479-81 (discussing how “procedural justice” is best 
achieved when “principal is the party exercising control over the process”). 
42 See Effron, supra note 2, at 695 n.35 (listing and summarizing broader literature on 
judicial discretion). 
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taking a particular action in a case.43 These possible outcomes are not infinite, 
and the boundaries within which judges may come to their decision define the 
scope of discretion.44 Discretion has been described as “primary and 
secondary,”45 “substantive” and “procedural,”46 and “explicit” and 
“interpretive.”47 Most scholarly inquiries into the nature of judicial discretion 
struggle with determining the sources of authority for such discretion, 
determining the scope of discretion itself, and answering normative questions 
regarding the virtues of a system in which judges enjoy a range of discretionary 
flexibility. 
In previous work, I have written about the “particular procedural role” that 
judicial discretion plays “with regard to procedural devices.”48 The flexibility in 
decision-making that judicial discretion affords is the foundation of a judge’s 
ability to make the workaday, case-by-case procedural choices that shape the 
life of a lawsuit.49 This fact is at the center of one of the bigger controversies 
surrounding broad procedural discretion, for it has enabled trial judges to 
become the managers or administrators of lawsuits, leading to intense debates 
over whether such managerial judging is desirable.50 All in all, some measure of 
judicial discretion is accepted as an inevitable feature of the common law legal 
system,51 but the ongoing scholarly debate shows discomfort with its appropriate 
use and boundaries, particularly as a procedural tool of managerial judging.52 
 
43 See Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of 
Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 952 (2010) (examining judicial discretion “across 
contexts” to contemplate range of potential outcomes). 
44 Id. (“Within the bounds of discretion, any outcome may be considered ‘legal’ insofar as 
it has the imprimatur of legitimate authority as a permissible outcome.”). 
45 Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 
22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971). 
46 Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 
1567-74 (2003) (providing broader typology of discretion). 
47 Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 2, at 1967-70. 
48 Effron, supra note 2, at 695. 
49 See Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute, supra note 2, at 80 (stating that 
procedural discretion was deliberate choice by drafters of federal rules); Carrington, supra 
note 2, at 2081-85 (describing procedural flexibility); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1975 
(discussing how judicial discretion, as deliberately provided for in federal rules, allows judges 
flexibility to deal fairly with case at hand). 
50 See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying text (discussing phenomenon of managerial 
judging and summarizing debate over its desirability); see also Effron, supra note 2, at 696 
n.39 (collecting sources critical of managerial judging). 
51 See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 412 (2007). 
52 Much of the debate concerns the specific problems of managerial judging in complex 
litigation, which has its own dynamics and underlying policy problems. See generally Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027 
(2013) (analyzing managerial judging concerns in complex civil cases under bifurcated 
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It is interesting to note the extent to which some critiques of the broad or 
liberal use of judicial discretion in procedural decisions overlap with other 
criticisms leveled at private procedural ordering. For example, exercises of 
broad procedural discretion have been criticized for promoting inconsistency 
and unpredictability in rule applications and outcomes,53 for failing to result in 
transparent decision-making,54 for the inability to promote a reliable record of 
common law rulemaking and resist the boundaries of precedent,55 for creating 
legal rules and outcomes outside the authority of elected or delegated 
rulemakers,56 and for the fact that the decisions are unreviewable by another 
judicial authority, either as a matter of law or as a practical reality.57 
Looking at private procedural ordering and judicial discretion together, the 
larger questions come into focus: Who controls litigation and who authors the 
rules that control litigation? In one sense, these two concepts appear to be in 
opposition to one another. Judicial discretion is a tool by which a judge has broad 
authority to shape, interpret, and apply procedural devices during litigation. 
Private procedural ordering, by contrast, is a tool in which it is not the judge, but 
the parties who wield this power. That being said, the shared critiques of 
procedural judicial discretion and private procedural ordering reveal similar 
discomfort with procedural rules and devices that seem to lack consistency, 
transparency, known authorship, and meaningful authority. It is no surprise, 
then, that the existence of both of these procedural tools leads to both 
coexistence and conflict. 
 
analysis of judicially supervised post-adjudication remedies, deemed “substantive,” and 
pretrial proceedings, deemed “procedural”). 
53 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 424-26 (1982); see also 
Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
287, 301 (2010) (criticizing degree of variability in trial judges’ discretionary decisions). 
54 Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 2, at 1974 (criticizing managerial discretion for 
transparency problems); see also Carlos E. González, Turning Unambiguous Statutory 
Materials into Ambiguous Statutes: Ordering Principles, Avoidance, and Transparent 
Justification in Cases of Interpretive Choice, 61 DUKE L.J. 583, 627-38 (2011) (encouraging 
use of transparent justification in tandem with judicial discretion in interpretation of statutory 
materials). 
55 Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 76-77 (1995) (criticizing managerial district 
judges for, inter alia, being unconstrained by precedent and making up “their own rules on an 
ad hoc basis”). 
56 Id. at 79-81 (contesting that concentration of discretionary power in district courts 
removes checks on judicial power that Framers intended); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 
supra note 1, at 597 (noting that government officials working outside courthouses are now 
delegated judicial authority). 
57 Resnik, supra note 53, at 425-26 (noting that managerial discretion leads to decisions 
beyond reach of appellate review). 
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II. WHEN PRIVATE PROCEDURAL ORDERING AND  
JUDICIAL DISCRETION MEET AND COMPETE 
Procedural judicial discretion and private procedural ordering via party 
agreement are integral, if sometimes controversial, parts of modern civil 
procedure. The two concepts need to be considered in tandem because they both 
prompt questions about who should be in the driver’s seat when it comes to 
promulgating, interpreting, and applying procedural rules.58 Because judicial 
discretion and private procedural ordering can be used to ramp up or dial back 
procedural rulemaking in the absence of rules promulgated by drafters, 
rulemakers have utilized both concepts, either tacitly or formally. In some 
instances, a conscious choice to harness both phenomena can result in relatively 
clear and manageable rules. In other cases, a less deliberate use of both judicial 
discretion and private procedural ordering can result in rules or doctrines that 
might seem clear enough on first blush, but which have, in practice, resulted in 
doctrinal morass. 
In this Part, I examine how rulemakers and courts can deliberately deploy the 
tools of judicial discretion and private procedural ordering, either alone or in 
tandem. In some instances, rulemakers choose to employ them as 
complementary tools. In other circumstances, judicial discretion and party 
agreement are viewed as clashing or perhaps even mutually exclusive values in 
which only one can emerge victorious. 
This Part explores three areas of civil procedure that exemplify the interaction 
of judicial discretion and party agreement. It begins with civil discovery, an area 
in which rulemakers have made a conscious decision to deploy judicial 
discretion and party agreement as complementary tools. It then moves on to 
settlement, an area of procedure in which judicial discretion and party agreement 
coexist with far less stability. Finally, this Part concludes by examining the 
enforcement of forum selection clauses under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a realm in 
which the Supreme Court has shown open hostility to the idea of judicial 
discretion and party agreement as compatible values. 
A. Private Procedural Ordering and Judicial Discretion in Civil Discovery 
The complementary relationship of judicial discretion and private procedural 
ordering is best on display in the federal rules of discovery; they are the day-to-
day examples of how party and judicial control can affect one another. The 
federal discovery rules are far from uncontroversial, evidenced by both sustained 
critique and vigorous defense from the bench, bar, and scholarly communities. 
Even when contemplating major changes to the discovery rules, the rules’ 
drafters have not strayed from the fundamental tools of party agreement and 
 
58 See Blair, supra note 1, at 802-03 (“[M]any of our public procedural rules delegate to 
judges the task of specifying precise obligations after a dispute has arisen. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, the rules also leave litigants with broad discretion in conducting their 
affairs throughout the litigation process.”). 
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judicial discretion. Instead, the changes, including significant recent 
amendments, merely tweak and reallocate power as between these two 
mechanisms. 
The lesson from this Section is more than simply repeating the oft-stated 
observation that American discovery is a system of party control with modest, 
often discretionary, judicial intervention. Rather, this Section uses the 2015 
discovery amendments to show the depth of rulemakers’ commitment to this 
system—when confronted with supposed problems of party behavior, their 
instinct is to adjust the balance between private procedural ordering and judicial 
discretion, rather than to think outside of that dynamic altogether to imagine a 
different system or solution. 
1. The Design of the Federal Rules 
The rules of discovery are part of a system in which rulemakers have 
harnessed, and recently repurposed, the relationship between private procedural 
ordering and judicial discretion to maximize the effects of both. On the private 
procedural ordering end, the rules’ design encourages party agreement and 
preferences within certain boundaries. These boundaries exist not only in the 
text of the rules, but in the exercise of judicial discretion in a realm where such 
discretion is particularly prominent—case management. 
Civil discovery occurs, for the most part, outside the courthouse and without 
continual supervision and direction of a judicial officer.59 The parties to a dispute 
are expected to follow the rules of discovery delineated in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) and negotiate deviations from the rules without direct 
judicial intervention.60 In other words, the FRCP not only tolerate private 
procedural ordering during discovery, but are designed to promote it.61 This 
Section reviews the preference for party negotiation and agreement prior to and 
during discovery as well as the extent of judicial discretion over these same 
issues. 
 
59 John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 
518 (2000) (asserting that judges steer clear of getting involved in discovery matters as much 
as possible); Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality 
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 348 (1999) (“[D]iscovery is a self-
executing process that takes place outside of the public view with a minimum of judicial 
involvement and oversight.”); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity 
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1181, 1255-57 (2005) (noting that judicial employment of inquisitorial masters, who 
are often unduly influenced by party, is extensive and not subject to public accountability). 
60 Doré, supra note 59, at 348-49 (explaining that discovery rules are “self-regulating” 
mechanism for litigants). 
61 Kessler, supra note 59, at 1253 (stating that procedural devices like discovery “are now 
in control of the parties, rather than the court”). 
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Most discovery devices, such as depositions, interrogatories, and requests for 
admission, are governed by rules that set default parameters on the exercise of 
that device. These defaults can be altered either by party agreement, with leave 
of the court, or both. For example, the rules limit the number of oral depositions 
that parties may take62 and the number of interrogatories a litigant may 
propound.63 However, the parties are free to depart from these limitations by 
stipulation. If the parties cannot agree, the party seeking a departure may ask the 
judge for leave to conduct additional depositions or interrogatories.64 The ability 
to vary from the default rules by party agreement extends to other discovery 
devices, such as the timing or place of discovery events.65 
The discovery rules are designed to foster planning and agreement by the 
parties on the minutiae of procedure that will govern civil discovery in any given 
case. The assumption is that the parties themselves are in the best position to 
know and negotiate how much discovery is needed, what materials fall within 
the scope of discovery, and when and where discovery events should take place. 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 30 (oral depositions) states that one 
purpose of the default limit on the number of depositions is “to emphasize that 
counsel have a professional obligation to develop a mutual cost-effective plan 
for discovery in the case.”66 Inter-party negotiation and agreement is thought to 
produce the best and perhaps most efficient outcome, although there are some 
situations in which this logic breaks down. Most notably, there are worries that 
such agreements in class actions or other mass actions result in elaborate 
discovery plans that enrich the lawyers at the expense of their clients.67 
The private procedural ordering model permeates the entire discovery 
process. Rule 26(f) requires that the parties meet for a conference to develop a 
 
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (setting default limit at ten depositions per party). 
63 Id. 33(a)(1) (setting default limit at twenty-five interrogatories per party). 
64 Id. 30(a)(2)(A) (requiring parties to obtain leave of court “if the parties have not 
stipulated to the deposition” and depositions exceed default limits of number or time); id. 
33(a)(1) (limiting interrogatory number at twenty-five “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or 
ordered by the court”). 
65 Id. 31(a)(2)(ii) (deposing individual who has already been deposed in the matter); id. 
33(b)(2) (setting default time to respond to interrogatory at thirty days, but parties may 
mutually agree on shorter or longer time); id. 34(b)(2)(A) (setting default time to respond to 
discovery request at thirty days). 
66 Id. 30(a)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
67 Scholars have described this as an agency problem between class members and class 
action lawyers. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1939, 1948 (2011) (“The agent-principal problem is a crucial issue in the class context 
because neither the class as a whole nor its individual members exercise control over the 
lawyer.”); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 120-30 (2010) 
(describing problem of attorneys’ fees and attorney self-enrichment in multiple-district 
litigations). 
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discovery plan before they meet for the judicially supervised scheduling 
conference provided for in Rule 16.68 Although Rule 26(f) does not mandate that 
the parties reach an agreement, it does require that they “attempt[] in good faith 
to agree on the proposed discovery plan.”69 Issues on which the parties cannot 
agree are reserved for later judicial involvement, either at the Rule 16 conference 
or by motions to compel or protect the disclosure of particular information.70 
The push for party agreement is pervasive even when the parties clash during 
the course of discovery. The rules encourage parties to resolve discovery 
disputes outside the judge’s presence. Disputes that cannot be resolved are, for 
the most part, set aside for later adjudication.71 The fact that the occasional select 
discovery device, such as a physical or mental examination, requires judicial 
intervention only serves to highlight that the use of other devices should not 
routinely incorporate judicial involvement.72 The rules do not encourage or 
reward parties for bringing their discovery disputes directly to the judge’s 
attention.73 In fact, parties that eschew these rather obvious cues can be subject 
to judicial ridicule.74 Although judges clearly retain the final authority on 
resolving discovery disputes, the rulemakers’ preference for resolution via party 
agreement is quite clear. 
Much of what I have just described—the preference for fostering party 
agreement as to how civil discovery will be conducted in a given lawsuit—might 
not look much like party rulemaking, a point to which I return later.75 For the 
 
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
69 Id. 26(f)(2). 
70 Id. 16(a), 37(a). 
71 See id. 37(a) (giving parties option to make motion when parties cannot agree to 
sufficiency of other’s actions). 
72 See id. 35(a)(1) (“The court . . . may order a party . . . to submit to a physical or mental 
examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner.”). In some states, even physical and 
mental examinations do not require a court order. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3121 (McKinney 
2012) (allowing “any party [to] serve notice on another party to submit to a physical, mental 
or blood examination”). 
73 See Beckerman, supra note 59, at 550 (explaining that motions to compel and motions 
for protective orders are rarely filed and granted because they “inevitably require fact-
scrutinizing judicial interventions typically after full briefing, [and] the procedures are time-
consuming and generate much fact-intensive, satellite litigation”); Timothy Wilson, A 
Mandate for Failure: The Sedona Cooperation Proclamation and Modern Discovery Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 165, 168 (2013) (noticing in 
general that federal rules encourage counsel to cooperate). 
74 See Avista Mgmt., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 6:05-cv-01430, 2006 WL 
1562246, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006) (responding to latest in series of motions to resolve 
discovery disputes by ordering that “counsel shall engage in one (1) game of ‘rock, paper, 
scissors’” on the courthouse steps, “[t]he winner of [which] shall be entitled to select the 
location for the 30(b)(6) deposition”). 
75 See infra Section III.B.2. 
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time being, it is sufficient to note that civil discovery is an area of procedure in 
which rulemakers have made a conspicuous effort to draw out parties’ 
preferences as to the content of procedural rules and implement these 
preferences as much as possible. 
Although the promotion of private procedural ordering is a major goal of the 
rules of civil discovery, the use of judicial discretion is also of great importance. 
Judges have a good deal of discretion to make case-specific rulings about 
discovery on both the front and back ends of civil discovery.76 
On the front end, trial judges are involved in delineating the scope, timing, 
and methods of discovery.77 While the parties are expected to negotiate many 
aspects of these boundaries before the Rule 16 conference, the judge retains a 
significant amount of authority to approve, reject, or refashion these decisions.78 
This authority is considered part of the court’s broader discretion “in ruling on 
pre-trial management matters,”79 and thus courts have “broad discretion in 
structuring discovery.”80 An appeals court will only disturb a trial judge’s 
discovery rulings if they result in “fundamental unfairness in the trial of the 
case”81 or “manifest injustice.”82 
Beyond issues of scope and timing, judges have broad discretion to fashion 
discovery limits that protect a party’s interest. For example, a party may seek 
protective orders to block disclosure of sensitive materials such as trade 
secrets.83 Trial judges have “substantial latitude to fashion protective orders” 
because of “[t]he unique character of the discovery process” and the fact that the 
trial judge is in the “best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and 
interests of parties affected by discovery.”84 While judicial discretion here is not 
 
76 Matthew Shapiro has characterized this model as an ex ante delegation of state power 
to conduct aspects of legal proceedings, such as discovery, that is policed by state power as 
an ex post manner. Shapiro, supra note 17 (manuscript at 16-19) (on file with author). 
77 Much of this happens at the Rule 16 scheduling conference. 
78 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (noting that 
“[m]any judges who hold such conferences find them an efficient way to resolve most 
discovery disputes without the delay and burdens attending a formal motion, but the decision 
whether to require such conferences is left to the discretion of the judge in each case”). 
79 Wells Real Estate Inv. Tr. II, Inc. v. Chardon/Hato Rey P’ship, 615 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
80 Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
81 Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1977). 
82 Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989) (defining manifest 
injustice as “where the lower court’s discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in 
substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party”). 
83 See Jordana Cooper, Beyond Judicial Discretion: Toward a Rights-Based Theory of 
Civil Discovery and Protective Orders, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 775, 784-85 (2005) (noting that when 
trade secret is at issue, court may, at its discretion, issue protective order). 
84 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). 
  
2018] OUSTED 145 
 
unlimited,85 the judge still retains a substantial ability to tailor the order and 
remedy to the specifics of a given case. 
On the back end, judges have the discretion to control the timing of discovery, 
both in terms of scheduling and enforcing deadlines.86 Judges also have broad 
discretion to enforce discovery orders and fashion remedies for discovery 
violations, where the extent of the judge’s discretion is on full display. Many of 
the front-end decisions that judges make are so managerial that the judge 
functions more as an administrator than a prototypical legal adjudicator.87 But 
the judge’s role in resolving discovery disputes and enforcing discovery orders 
is much closer to the judicial discretion that judges utilize in interpreting and 
applying substantive legal rules.88 For example, in using broad and open-ended 
language to regulate when a judge should impose sanctions and exactly what 
those sanctions should be,89 rulemakers have delegated a hefty dose of 
interpretive discretion to trial judges. Rather than attempting to catalogue in 
advance the myriad iterations of discovery violations and how they should be 
sanctioned, rulemakers have left to judges the task of assessing the problem and 
fashioning remedies on a case-by-case basis. 
Even accounting for the interpretive discretion that judges enjoy on the back 
end of discovery, the federal discovery rules taken as a whole enable judges to 
use their discretion so that they function as litigation managers.90 This 
increasingly managerial role has been criticized over the years, most notably by 
 
85 See Cooper, supra note 83, at 779-84 (arguing that Seattle Times doctrine has been 
limited by lower court cases imposing high burden for obtaining protective orders in privacy 
cases). 
86 See Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002) (“At the 
heart of this case is the authority of the district court to control the pace of litigation before 
it.”). 
87 See Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil 
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 960 (1998) (explaining that many judges have adopted 
“‘managerial judging’ techniques aimed at containing costs and encouraging settlements” as 
result of federal discovery rules having altered litigation dynamics by making lawsuits more 
expensive). 
88 See Shapiro, supra note 17 (manuscript at 18) (on file with author) (stressing ex post 
policing power of judges in enforcing discovery processes initially controlled by parties). 
89 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Some of the language is a curious combination of 
seemingly mandatory but actually discretionary standards. For example, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) 
states that the court “must” order the sanctioned party to pay “reasonable expenses, including 
attorney’s fees,” but then allows a judge to decline to award such fees under the relatively 
open-ended standard that “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. 
37(b)(2)(C). 
90 See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 669, 671-72 (2010) (“[A] series of amendments have enshrined active judicial case 
management into the [FRCP] . . . [thereby] enabling it by giving district judges an ever-
expanding set of case-management tools to be used in its pursuit.”). 
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Judith Resnik,91 yet judges have also been subject to criticism that they either 
cannot or will not exercise enough authority to reign in so-called “discovery 
abuses.”92 
This state of affairs in which judges are simultaneously accused of being too 
managerial, yet are not imposing sufficiently strong controls over discovery is, 
in part, the result of a system designed to promote both private procedural 
ordering and judicial discretion. In this system, exercises of judicial managerial 
authority can just as easily be classified as belonging to the party agreement 
realm as they can to the judicial discretion realm. In considering the role of the 
judge in privatized procedure agreements, Professor Bone has observed that: 
[W]e have . . . assum[ed] a bilateral agreement between two parties. 
However, the trial judge can be involved in the agreement as well. Trial 
judges have broad case-management powers and often “negotiate” with the 
parties to establish discovery limits, trial deadlines, and the like. While the 
arrangement is not exactly contractual—the judge has the final word and 
in theory, at least, can impose procedures unilaterally—the result can 
resemble a three-party contract when the judge has something to lose by 
thwarting the parties’ preferences (such as overseeing a more protracted 
litigation). Moreover, even when parties agree in advance, the trial judge 
often has power to check the agreement ex post.93 
In other words, judges and litigants occupy an uneasy space in discovery, tipping 
back and forth between the world of private procedural ordering, in which the 
public figure of the judge is an unexpected third party, and the world of judicial 
discretion and management, in which the parties are unusually robust 
participants. 
2. Party Preference and Judicial Discretion in the 2015 Federal Rules 
Amendments 
One of the difficulties in the “discovery abuse” debate has been in producing 
solid empirical data to back up claims that American litigation has a problem 
 
91 Resnik, supra note 53, at 424-31 (criticizing judicial management for, inter alia, creating 
vast new powers and threatening impartiality). 
92 Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule 37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”: More Bark than Bite, 42 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 109, 110-11 (2011) (stating that in 1980 and 2008 studies conducted by 
American College of Trial Lawyers, “practitioners complained that judges were not 
adequately enforcing the discovery rules governing sanctions” and turning blind eye to 
discovery abuse); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 
113 YALE L.J. 27, 40 (2003) (stating that if judges do not intervene when suspecting discovery 
abuse, “overzealous litigants might not only inflict harm on their immediate adversaries, but 
also clog dockets and thereby deprive future litigants of their day in court”). 
93 Bone, supra note 4, at 1340. 
  
2018] OUSTED 147 
 
with discovery that is “too much” or “too onerous” or “too expensive.”94 These 
accusations have always had a denominator problem—what is the appropriate 
baseline against which one can make a credible argument about the “right” 
amount or cost of discovery? The federal rules have been notoriously vague 
about the normative underpinnings that might guide one towards a meaningful 
answer to that question, notwithstanding very general language directing judges 
and litigants towards rulings and actions that would “secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”95 It is against this 
debate, and in the context of my arguments regarding the relationship between 
party agreement and judicial discretion, that I offer a few observations about the 
2015 amendments to the federal rules. 
Scholars and commentators have written in great detail about the substance 
of the 2015 amendments and the motivation behind the changes.96 What I find 
interesting about the amendments is the extent to which they attack the details 
of the relationship of private procedural ordering vis-à-vis judicial discretion 
while leaving the basic structure of this arrangement in place. 
 
94 Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 
39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 798 (1998) (stating that Columbia researchers “divided the number of 
days spent in discovery by the total number of days spent on a case and found that the 
proportion of litigation time spent in discovery was about 43% for heavy discovery cases, but 
only 25-31% in the average case”); see also PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & 
MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION 
PROCESS: DISCOVERY 34-44 (1978), cited in McKenna & Wiggins, supra, at 791, and 
Beckerman, supra note 59, at 506 (finding that about five percent of district court judges’ 
case-related time is spent on discovery matters, including scheduling and management efforts, 
as well as resolving discovery motions, protective orders, and the like); John L. Carroll, 
Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455, 463 (2010) 
(citing ABA surveys which show that significant number—seventy-six percent—of litigators 
in federal court believe discovery courts to be “excessive” and “draining” of parties’ 
resources); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willing, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal 
Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 779 (2010) (arguing that empirical research “has not 
provided support for the prevailing view that discovery costs are necessarily the major cost 
driver in litigation”). 
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
96 See generally Amii N. Castle, A Comprehensive Overview: 2015 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 837 (2016) (explaining changes to 2015 
amendments and analyzing advisory committee notes); Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The 
Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-
Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 
(2015) (overviewing 2015 amendments and polarized reactions to them); Richard Briles 
Moriarty, And Now for Something Completely Different: Are the Federal Civil Discovery 
Rules Moving Forward into a New Age or Shifting Backward into a “Dark” Age?, 39 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 227 (2015) (examining 2015 amendments, analyzing them as unacceptable, 
and criticizing committee appointment process that underlies said changes). 
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It must be stressed that this is an observation about the interplay of private 
procedural ordering and judicial discretion, and not a normative conclusion 
about this particular strategy. Just because rulemakers seem to have settled upon 
regulating civil discovery by exploiting some sort of equilibrium between party 
preference and judicial discretion does not mean that the resulting rules will 
always be fair or efficient. Several commentators have roundly criticized the 
new “proportionality” rule for discovery.97 While I will leave the substantive 
critiques to these other scholars, it is worth noting here that such a rule was not 
simply a product of anti-plaintiff sentiment,98 but perhaps the inevitable result 
of demanding that litigants and judges do the day-to-day work of filling in the 
details of the written default rules. 
The purported aim of the 2015 amendments was to reduce the amount and 
cost of discovery in civil litigation.99 Despite the alarmist reports of civil 
discovery as an abusive and ruinous part of the American litigation system,100 it 
is worth noting what the amendments did not do. The amendments did not 
fundamentally reimagine the discovery system from the ground up.101 Even 
though litigants are repeatedly accused of engaging in excessive discovery 
practices, the fundamental structure of discovery remains unchanged—it is still 
overseen by the trial judge, with the details and execution being driven by the 
parties and taking place outside of direct judicial supervision. Judges still 
maintain a healthy amount of discretion to fashion discovery orders and tailor 
 
97 Moriarty, supra note 96, at 248-51 (advocating for courts to resist prioritizing certain 
discovery materials over others under Rule 26(b)(1)); Letter of 171 Law Professors Urging 
Rejection of Changing Federal Rules to Limit Discovery and Eliminate Forms, to Comm. on 
Rules & Practice Procedure (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
02/FRCP-letter-with-signatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KUN-NPCT] (voicing objections 
against amendments that “would limit the scope of discovery, [and] provide more restrictive 
presumptive discovery limits” out of concern of increased litigation costs and limiting access 
to courts). But see generally John J. Jablonski & Alexander R. Dahl, The 2015 Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Guide to Proportionality in Discovery and 
Implementing a Safe Harbor for Preservation, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 411 (2015) (defending 2015 
amendments). 
98 See Moore, supra note 96, passim (discussing various driving forces behind 2015 
amendments). 
99 Andrew S. Pollis, Busting up the Pretrial Industry, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097, 2105 
(2017). 
100 See id. at 2107. 
101 See id. at 2105 (“[T]here are no substantive changes in the rules that will ensure 
significant change, so it is questionable whether the changes will make progress toward that 
objective.” (footnote omitted)). 
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sanctions on a case-by-case basis, and parties are still expected to more or less 
self-administer discovery.102 
It is not surprising that the Advisory Committee was not ready to completely 
revamp the entire discovery system. Such fundamental and systemic change 
would have required far more research, drafting, and debate than the Advisory 
Committee was likely willing to take on.103 And given the criticism that ensued 
after the amendments, it is unlikely the Advisory Committee could have reached 
consensus on such a revamp. A complete rethinking of the basic structure of 
discovery would have seemed disruptive and revolutionary, although one should 
note that the basic private procedural ordering/judicial discretion model of 
regulation is not universal. As I argue in Section II.C, there are some areas of 
procedural law in which party agreement and judicial discretion are viewed as 
incompatible instruments, rather than the complementary foundations of an 
entire system. 
Given the tacit decision to maintain the basic private procedural 
ordering/judicial discretion foundation, the Advisory Committee had two 
possible avenues through which they could make changes to the discovery rules: 
alter the boundaries of private procedural ordering or alter the boundaries of 
judicial discretion. Although the Advisory Committee considered proposals in 
both areas, they ultimately drafted amendments that were aimed primarily at 
judicial discretion. 
Changes to Private Procedural Ordering. The Advisory Committee had, at 
various points, considered tightening up the baselines for some aspects of party 
agreement. For example, the original proposal included cutting “the allowed 
number of depositions from ten to five; reduc[ing] the allowed duration of a 
deposition from seven hours to six; reduc[ing] the allowed number of 
interrogatories from twenty-five to fifteen; and limit[ing] requests to admit for 
the first time ever to twenty-five.”104 The Advisory Committee later withdrew 
these proposals but not the new limits imposed by applying the “proportionality” 
rule to the administration of these discovery devices.105 Although these 
 
102 The existence of judicial discretion does not necessarily ensure that judicial supervision 
is of high quality. As Professor Andrew Pollis has observed, “the very nature of discovery 
disputes renders them vulnerable to poor judicial oversight.” Id. at 2104. 
103 Moreover, suppose that such an overhaul had involved eschewing some of the broad 
and open-ended discovery standards for longer and more precise rules. These rules would 
have needed some sort of empirical and normative grounding that would allow rulemakers, 
judges, or both to delineate the right amount of discovery. As I have already noted, the existing 
research is thin and, at best, presents conflicting results. See supra note 94 and accompanying 
text (describing difficulty in producing empirical data on discovery). Nonetheless, the 
decision to maintain the status quo of the discovery system’s basic design was not inevitable, 
especially given the tone of crisis-proportions that many critics took. 
104 See Moore, supra note 96, at 1122. 
105 Id. 
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amendments would not have changed the structure of the rules in which parties 
can agree to depart from the default, by narrowing the baseline, the rules might 
have effectively narrowed the world of possibilities over which the parties could 
negotiate and agree. Still, having considered changing the negotiating context 
for parties conducting discovery, the Advisory Committee chose instead to 
tighten the scope of judicial discretion on the back end. Although parties will 
undoubtedly bargain in the shadow of the new proportionality rule, it is 
significant that the Advisory Committee left the party agreement defaults 
unchanged. 
If anything, the 2015 amendments stressed the prominence of the private 
procedural ordering model. An amendment to Rule 1 added “the parties” to “the 
court” as persons whose conduct should promote “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive” resolution of lawsuits.106 The Committee Notes make an explicit 
appeal to the parties to cooperate with each other to achieve these ends,107 and 
Chief Justice Roberts called attention to this emphasis on cooperation in his 2015 
Year End Report.108 Of course, casting this model as “cooperation” can 
whitewash a system in which “agreement” or “cooperation” are euphemisms for 
the exercises of unequal bargaining power or manipulative behavior.109 
Accordingly, a preference for private procedural ordering in the form of 
encouraging party agreement during discovery can replicate many of the 
concerns that commentators have expressed about ex ante agreements that alter 
litigation rules. 
Changes to Judicial Discretion. The biggest change to the discovery rules in 
the 2015 amendments was to the standard that governs the scope of discovery, 
as well as the standard that governs permissible deviations from the default 
 
106 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“Rule 1 is amended 
to emphasize that just as the court should construe and administer these rules to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, so the parties share the 
responsibility to employ the rules in the same way.”). 
107 Id. (“Effective advocacy is consistent with—and indeed depends upon—
cooperative . . . use of procedure.”); see also Moore, supra note 96, at 1100-06 (discussing 
how Advisory Committee considered value of party cooperation in drafting 2015 
amendments). 
108 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6 (2015), https://www.supremeco 
urt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAQ8-X3D9] (stating 
Rule 1 “make[s] express the obligation of judges and lawyers to work cooperatively”). 
109 As Pollis has noted: 
the meet-and-confer requirement actually provides additional incentives not to provide 
discovery in the first instance because the responding party knows that its adversary 
cannot move to compel discovery without having first attempted these promotion 
negotiations; the withholding party can thus eventually retreat from unreasonable 
positions with impunity, depriving the requesting party an opportunity to expose the 
recalcitrance to the court. 
Pollis, supra note 99, at 2104. 
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number of discovery tools, such as depositions and interrogatories. Under the 
old rules, the standard for the scope of discovery was “relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense” and a trial judge had the discretion to broaden the scope of 
discovery to include “any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
action.”110 The 2015 amendments added a significant qualification to the 
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense” standard by appending “and 
proportional to the needs of the case” to the text of Rule 26(b).111 This means 
that, although the 2015 amendments gave judges a more prominent role in 
determining the content of the rules regarding the scope of discovery, such as 
the availability of additional depositions, interrogatories, and the like, they did 
so by narrowing the scope of discretion that judges can exercise in determining 
the appropriate boundaries of discovery. Judges have been instructed to take a 
more active role, but only within the confines of a stricter standard imposed by 
the rulemakers. 
The 2015 amendments, then, show how deeply ingrained the private 
procedural ordering model is in the discovery process. The rulemakers built on, 
and then designed, a system of party control reinforced by broadly discretionary 
judicial authority. As critics lodged increasingly loud complaints about party 
behavior in discovery, the rulemakers did almost nothing to address the parties 
themselves, nor did they reassign authority and managerial responsibility back 
to the court in any meaningful way. Rather, they pulled on the lever of judicial 
discretion—narrowing the scope of permissible judicial answers rather than 
beefing up actual judicial involvement or directly policing the parties. While 
parties must now bargain in the shadow of a new rule, the emphasis of the rule 
remains on bargain rather than on the shadow. 
B. Private Procedural Ordering and Judicial Discretion in Settlement 
Settlement is one of the oldest forms of privatized procedure. At its core, a 
settlement is simply a way of ending a lawsuit by party agreement rather than 
by judicial disposition. As such, settlements have long been a relatively 
unregulated area of civil procedure. The lack of regulation rests on background 
assumptions that parties have the right to agree on an out-of-court settlement and 
that courts have the inherent power to permit such agreements, even if a judicial 
disposition would have led to an alternative outcome.112 A court order is not 
even necessary for the formal dismissal of a settled case.113 
For the most part, settlements are unregulated. There are, however, a few 
situations in which settlements are in fact governed by judicially or legislatively 
 
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2012). 
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
112 See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 
1718-25 (2012). 
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (stating that plaintiff may dismiss action without court order 
by adhering to certain filing requirements). 
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promulgated rules.114 Given the tight relationship between the permissibility of 
privately resolving a dispute and the inherent powers of the court, settlement is 
an excellent place to examine the interplay of party agreement and judicial 
discretion. The types of claims that require judicial approval of settlements—for 
example, bankruptcy claims, antitrust consent decrees, claims asserted in class 
actions, and cases involving minors and incompetents—implicate “certain 
interests—either specific interests of parties not personally before the court or 
broader public interests” that the rulemakers have singled out for special 
protection.115 To illustrate the relationship between the rules governing judicial 
approval of certain settlements and the exercise of judicial discretion, I shall 
focus on two of the more prominent examples: the settlement of class actions, 
and the settlement of non-class mass actions. I argue that judicial discretion and 
private procedural ordering have an uneasy coexistence in the law of settlements. 
While the values are not necessarily incompatible, they do not enjoy the 
complementary status that I have described in the realm of civil discovery. 
1. Settlement in Class Actions 
In federal court, class action settlements require judicial approval. According 
to Rule 23(e)(2), a federal judge must hold a hearing to determine if a settlement 
is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” if it would bind class members.116 This rule 
makes sense in the context of other rules (or lack thereof) concerning judicial 
involvement in settlement. In ordinary situations, parties can always come to an 
agreement to settle a dispute without formal judicial involvement. There is no 
obligation to resort to the courts (or any dispute resolution tribunal) in the first 
place. Thus, if parties can reach such an agreement in the pre-suit context, there 
is very little reason to limit their ability to do so once a suit has been filed.117 But 
in the class action context, a settlement binds absent class members, and it is not 
clear that such individuals could have or would have made such agreements, 
thus there is a need for heightened judicial involvement.118 
 
114 See Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 123, 130-38 (2012) (detailing areas of law in which federal judges must approve 
settlements). 
115 Id. at 131. 
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
117 This tracks the ex ante/ex post reasoning about privatized procedure described earlier. 
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. But see Shapiro, supra note 17 (manuscript at 24) 
(on file with author) (arguing that “[e]ven settlements that aren’t memorialized in a court order 
generally end up functioning in practice much more like formal judgments than ordinary 
contracts”). 
118 See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. 
L. REV. 65, 69 (2003) (“Notwithstanding the judge’s role in overseeing class actions, fair 
results are far from guaranteed.”); see also Grabill, supra note 114, at 126 (“[M]ass tort 
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The text of Rule 23(e)(2) reads: “If the [settlement] proposal would bind class 
members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is 
fair, reasonable, and adequate.”119 This process has become known as the 
“fairness hearing.”120 The Rule contains both non-discretionary and 
discretionary elements. It is clear from the text that the judge does not have the 
discretion to decide whether to hold a hearing and make a finding—doing so is 
mandatory. However, the broad language of “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 
bestows a good deal of discretion on the judge to make factual and context-
specific findings.121 A district court’s findings approving (or rejecting) a class 
settlement are reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard.122 In 
interpreting the requirements of Rule 23(e)(2), courts have devised a multifactor 
inquiry into the procedural and substantive fairness of the settlement.123 As 
 
litigation requires active judicial involvement and oversight due to the sheer size and 
complexity of such matters.”). 
119 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
120 William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory 
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2006) (“The bridge linking the agency-cost 
literature’s concern with monitoring class counsel and the collateral-attack literature’s 
concern about revisiting this monitoring is the peculiar juridical moment known as the fairness 
hearing.”); see also Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 
87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2002 (1999) (stating that in class action settlements, judges perform 
functions different from their adjudicative functions to ensure fair result); Lahav, supra note 
118, at 91 (“The judge’s role in class actions ranges from the traditional responsibility to 
evaluate and determine cases, to the more modern responsibilities to manage the interaction 
of various actors, monitor agents, determine the extent of plaintiff participation, and 
encourage the case’s resolution.”). 
121 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 317 
(3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that courts must be “even more scrupulous than usual” in 
conducting fact finding when they examine the fairness of the proposed settlement (quoting 
In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir. 1995))). 
122 E.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We review a 
district court’s approval of a proposed class action settlement . . . for abuse of discretion.”); 
Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that in appellate courts, trial 
judge’s views should be given great weight). 
123 The nine factors of substantive fairness, known as the Grinnell factors, are: (1) the 
complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the 
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the 
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining 
the class action through trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; 
(8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; 
(9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the 
attendant risks of litigation. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 
1974). Most circuits have adopted these considerations as a multifactor test. See, e.g., Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); Linney v. Cellular 
Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998); Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 
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several commentators have observed, judges are not particularly keen to 
genuinely scrutinize or actually reject a class action settlement.124 
Looking at trial and appellate decisions concerning the approval or rejection 
of class actions, one sees a familiar pattern. Courts pay a good deal of lip service 
to the idea of judicial discretion, especially when exercising such discretion 
leads to the approval of a party agreement. However, when the exercise of such 
discretion appears to disturb the process or outcome of the underlying party 
agreement, the district judge’s action receives far more scrutiny. Specifically, 
the Third Circuit has described Rule 23(e) as giving district courts a “restricted, 
tightly focused role . . . requiring them to act as fiduciaries for the absent class 
members, but that does not vest them with broad powers to intrude upon the 
parties’ bargain.”125 Courts have held that the parties’ agreement should not be 
disturbed, even when there is a change in law or a ruling on a dispositive motion 
in one party’s favor,126 even though these changes could have significant effects 
on the outcome of a case that a settlement might or even should reflect if it is 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.”127 These changes could also inform the inquiry 
into counsel’s “appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating.”128 The 
language of many opinions reveals the struggle between two intuitions: the sense 
that the district court’s fairness hearing should be thorough and searching,129 and 
 
305, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 
(7th Cir. 1998); New Eng. Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First DataBank, Inc., 602 F. 
Supp. 2d 277, 280-81 (D. Mass. 2009). 
124 See Erichson, supra note 120, at 2004 (“Some judges have approved settlement class 
actions upon troublingly limited inquiries.”); Grabill, supra note 114, at 126 (stating that 
courts have struggled to apply established principles of judicial authority to evaluate and 
oversee class actions); Lahav, supra note 118, at 91 (arguing that judges do “not do enough 
to review settlements”); Rubenstein, supra note 120, at 1444-46 (describing deficits in judicial 
oversight of class action settlements). 
125 Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
126 See In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that trial 
court erred in ruling on motion for summary judgment after parties agreed to settlement). 
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
128 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 537 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In 
re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 235 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
129 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 298 
(3d Cir. 1998) (describing fairness hearing that included oral argument from all parties, 
including objectors and appearances by amicus curiae); see also Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l 
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that district courts must “exercise the highest 
degree of vigilance in scrutinizing” whether settlements were fair); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 
264 F.3d 286, 296 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The fiduciary duty [the district court has] to the class 
exists because the very nature of the class action device prevents many who have claims from 
directly participating in the litigation process.”); In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 
35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A] district court has the fiduciary responsibility of ensuring that the 
settlement is fair . . . .”). 
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the competing idea that a proposed settlement is “[e]ntitled to a [p]resumption 
of [f]airness.”130 
The above analysis suggests that even though judges have been given explicit 
authority and direction to use their discretion as a check against party agreement, 
they are reluctant to use this power in a robust way. One explanation for this 
phenomenon is that judges are inherently uncomfortable inserting themselves 
into a realm that has traditionally been so completely dominated by private 
ordering. 
Another explanation is that class action settlements actually resemble civil 
discovery in one crucial way—judges “suffer from a remarkable informational 
deficit in the fairness-hearing process.”131 Just as the parties in discovery are in 
a better position to know and negotiate on the minutiae of who should be 
deposed, when and where it should happen, and for how long,132 the parties to a 
class action have spent infinitely more time with the factual record of the lawsuit 
and its relationship to the details of the settlement than the judge. Presumably, 
the point of a fairness hearing is to force the judge to make such an acquaintance. 
But the private procedural ordering model is already so strong that it is easy, as 
a matter of theory and practice, for judges to shrink from the full scope of their 
discretion. 
As I explain Part III, the deliberate choice of rulemakers to insert judges into 
the settlement process and the ensuing judicial reticence to engage routinely and 
meaningfully in such agreements is not an accidental or quirky feature of class 
action litigation. It is not a decision to have a standard by which settlements are 
measured (a standard that does not exist in ordinary litigation), but a decision to 
make enforcement of that standard sufficiently discretionary that judges can 
allow the parties themselves to become co-interpreters of this rule. 
2. Settlement in Non-Class Mass Actions 
Formal judicial approval of settlements outside the class action context is rare. 
Most of the action and commentary in this area has developed in non-class mass 
actions. In 2010, Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein made headlines when he rejected a 
settlement between 9/11 first responders and the City of New York and other 
defendants.133 The first responders’ lawsuits were a mass action consolidated 
 
130 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating this 
presumption “may attach to a class settlement reached in arm’s-length negotiations between 
experienced, capable counsel after meaningful discovery” (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.42 (3d ed. 1995))). 
131 Rubenstein, supra note 120, at 1445. 
132 See Pollis, supra note 99, at 2104-05 (“The fact-intensive nature of the disputes is often 
a serious impediment to timely judicial attention, particularly because of other, ostensibly 
more pressing, obligations judges must fulfill.”). 
133 Mireya Navarro, Judge Rejects Deal on Health Claims of Workers at Ground Zero, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A12. 
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pursuant to a federal statute, but they were not a class action. Commentators 
criticized Judge Hellerstein for overstepping his authority, arguing that no such 
judicial approval was needed,134 and expressed disapproval for other recent 
examples of judicial involvement in the settlement of mass actions.135 An 
examination of these arguments reveals some of the deeper difficulties in 
untangling the relationship between private procedural ordering and judicial 
discretion. 
A primary criticism of judicial approval of non-class settlements is that there 
is no promulgated rule that actually grants judges such authority.136 The absence 
of such rules has led to the conclusion that “courts generally lack the authority 
to evaluate and/or oversee the implementation of settlements” because “an active 
role for the trial court in approving the adequacy of a settlement is the 
exceptional situation, not the general rule.”137 Moreover, the fact that the federal 
rules allow the parties to dismiss the case at any time by stipulation makes it 
“[p]rocedurally . . . impossible for the judge to become involved in overseeing a 
settlement.”138 The upshot is that, outside of the specifically delineated cases 
governed by Rule 23 and other federal statutes, there is no general rule or 
statutory authorization of judicial review of settlements, and the structure of the 
federal rules strongly suggests that such review is prohibited. 
The other criticism stresses the relationship between consent and settlement. 
In explaining why the rulemakers require judicial approval of class actions, 
commentators note the mandatory nature of the class and the binding nature of 
the settlement on absent class members.139 In a non-class mass action, there are 
 
134 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2013) (“What I wonder is where [Judge Hellerstein] got the 
power to ‘approve’ or ‘reject’ the settlement.”); Grabill, supra note 114, at 147-53 (discussing 
Judge Hellerstein’s management of settlement); Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an 
End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and “Rejection” out of Non-Class Mass 
Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 321 (2011) (“Judge Hellerstein was expanding upon a 
recent trend in non-class mass litigation where judges have been ‘approving’ non-class mass 
settlement, even though the Federal Rules do not authorize such a practice.”). The Second 
Circuit eventually issued a tacit approval of Judge Hellerstein’s fairness evaluation, although 
it remanded and vacated several issues related to the enforcement of the settlement terms. In 
re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 754 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2014). 
135 See Grabill, supra note 114, at 140-46 (describing litigation and settlements of Baycol 
and Vioxx cases in addition to 9/11 cases); Rothman, supra note 134, at 335-43 (discussing 
multidistrict litigations in which judges approved or reviewed proposed settlements). 
136 See Grabill, supra note 114, at 165 (“[N]o statute or rule authorizes or requires judicial 
review of private mass tort settlements.”). 
137 Id. at 129 (quoting United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 
1980)). 
138 Id. at 167 (quoting City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1330). 
139 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing how judicial involvement 
protects individuals not party to class action but nevertheless bound by settlement). 
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no absent class members, so each plaintiff is technically “at the table” and must 
agree in order to be bound by the judgment.140 Commentators who have argued 
for extending judicial authority to approve or reject settlements have thus made 
their argument within the confines of settlements of mass torts. While they 
acknowledge that judges probably do not have the authority to approve or reject 
settlements,141 commenters nevertheless base their arguments on several 
possible grounds. First, they advocate for extending the class action rule by 
arguing that the similarity between mass actions and class actions demands 
judicial involvement in settlement along the lines of the provisions of Rule 
23(e).142 Second, commenters reason judicial involvement can be expanded by 
the particular statutory scheme authorizing compensation, such as the 9/11 
statute.143 Finally, they argue that judicial involvement in settlement approval 
results is an information-forcing mechanism that affects the behavior of both the 
litigants and the judge in complex litigation.144 In other words, those seeking to 
defend judicial involvement do so not based on any normative powers of the 
court, but on a perceived lack of agency or consent by effectively-absent 
litigants—the same critique levied against private procedural ordering in other 
 
140 Grabill, supra note 114, at 127 (“[P]rivate mass tort settlements . . . are essentially 
analogous to settlements in private one-on-one litigation because . . . each affected litigant 
must affirmatively agree to be bound by any settlement.”). 
141 Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in 
Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 394-95, 420-21 (2007) (discussing limitations of 
judicial oversight in mass tort suits); Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The 
Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 854 (1997) (“[C]ourts . . . have 
neither obligation nor permission in individual civil litigation to scrutinize the adequacy of 
settlements.”). 
142 See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of 
Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 248 (2004) (proposing 
“liberal reading of Rule 23 that permits courts to approve collective settlements with class 
allegations regardless of their certification status”); Lahav, supra note 141, at 432 (“[J]udicial 
approval [under Rule 23(e)] should also be required in aggregative settlements . . . .”). 
143 See Wolff, supra note 52, at 1029-30 (“Judge Hellerstein acted within the proper scope 
of his authority in employing such forceful tactics with the litigants before him. His authority 
was not that of a generic ‘managerial judge.’ It was the authority to use case management and 
procedural innovation as tools for carrying into effect the distinctive liability policies enacted 
by Congress in the comprehensive statutory scheme that defined and limited the relief 
available to first responders.”). 
144 See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge 
in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1288-92 (2017) (arguing judges should 
use multidistrict litigation process to force disclosure of information to allow parties to make 
informed decisions in deciding whether to settle); David M. Jaros & Adam S. Zimmerman, 
Judging Aggregate Settlement, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 545, 552 (2017) (“[J]udicial review 
would mean . . . demanding more information about the parties’ competing interests in 
settlement . . . .”). 
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contexts.145 Thus, a judge might use procedural judicial discretion in its broadest 
sense—the ability to use the court’s inherent powers to try and intervene in 
relatively uncharted territory—as a counterbalance to private procedural 
ordering that the judge believes has gone too far. 
***** 
The reality is that the federal rules and federal procedural statutes do little if 
anything to regulate settlement outside of the few exceptions discussed above. 
Some commentators have argued that this vacuum is a result of a misplaced (or 
outdated) emphasis on trials or judicial adjudication.146 But that explanation 
misses the dynamic role of private procedural ordering. Perhaps a more 
meaningful explanation would be that the absence of such rules implies an 
ambivalence by the rulemakers as to the intersection of judicial discretion with 
party private procedural ordering as expressed through settlement. Given the 
tepid nature with which parties and courts exercise some of the few existing 
options for exercising judicial discretion and involvement with settlement, it 
seems unlikely that one could expect either the rulemakers or judges to flex more 
muscle in the judicial discretion realm. 
C. Judicial Discretion and Private Procedural Ordering in the Enforcement 
of Forum Selection Clauses 
Sections II.A and II.B showed the varying degrees of at once comfortable but 
also uneasy harmony in which private procedural ordering and judicial 
discretion coexist. In this Section, I turn to an example in which Congress has 
promulgated a rule that directly and explicitly grants broad judicial discretion, 
but in which the prominence of party agreement has crowded out discretion. The 
enforcement of forum selection clauses under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) has shown 
that, in some cases, judges are wary that judicial discretion and party agreement 
can safely coexist. This is an example in which the existence and scope of 
discretion is more controversial than the text or origin of the rule would suggest. 
Some procedural rules are explicit in their grant of judicial discretion. For 
example, Rule 51(b)(3) grants a district court judge discretion in choosing when 
 
145 In another high-profile example, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New 
York rejected a consent settlement between the SEC and Citigroup in the aftermath of the 
2008 banking crisis. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). The Second Circuit reversed Judge Rakoff’s decision, emphasizing the importance of 
respecting the agreement between the parties. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 
285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014). Although this case is somewhat instructive, its value is complicated 
by the fact that the Second Circuit was also concerned with the administrative law issue of 
deference to an agency decision as well as deference to party agreement. Id. at 296-97 (citing 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)). 
146 Glover, supra note 112, at 1727-44 (discussing how current procedural rules do not 
encourage settlements aligned with merits of case). 
  
2018] OUSTED 159 
 
to charge the jury. The Rule provides that the court “may instruct the jury at any 
time before the jury is discharged”147 and the Advisory Committee Notes 
reiterate that the purpose of the rule is “to give the court discretion to instruct 
the jury either before or after argument.”148 It would be hard to imagine an 
interpretation or application of Rule 51(b)(3) that would rigidly constrain a 
judge’s ability to choose the timing of a jury charge without running afoul of the 
text of the rule.149 
Although not every discretionary rule is as explicit as Rule 51 (or some of the 
other examples given in the previous Section), there are still rules that look 
relatively uncontroversial on the discretion front. And yet, the extent of that 
discretion has been narrowed to the point of making the discretion itself look 
like an illusion. This is what has happened with 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
Section 1404(a) codifies one of the federal transfer of venue provisions. It 
allows transfer from an otherwise proper venue under the following standard: 
“[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a 
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where 
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have 
consented.”150 Although this statute is meant to confer a healthy dose of 
discretion on the district judge, recent jurisprudence shows how sharply private 
procedural ordering can curb such discretion. 
Broad judicial discretion is built into the very text of § 1404(a). A judge “may 
transfer” a case, meaning that transfer under the rule is a permissible but not a 
mandatory outcome of a transfer motion.151 Because the statutory language is 
quite broad, courts have developed a framework of public and private factors 
that judges should use when assessing whether to order a transfer.152 These 
factors are similar, though not identical, to the factors that a court uses to 
 
147 FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3). 
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 51 advisory committee’s note to 1987 amendment (emphasis added). 
149 Indeed, the few direct citations to Rule 51(b)(3) in published opinions reaffirm the 
district judge’s broad discretion in timing jury instructions. See, e.g., Heimlicher v. Steele, 
615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 933 (N.D. Iowa 2009); Vialpando v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 92 F. 
App’x 612, 621 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that this timing discretion coexists with mandate to 
inform parties of any proposed instructions before charging jury). 
150 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
151 Id.; 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3847 (4th 
ed. 2013) (stating that trial judges have broad discretion in deciding whether to transfer case). 
152 For a typical formulation of the public and private factors, see Royal Bed & Spring Co. 
v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 1990) (listing 
private interests that need to be considered, including relative ease of access to sources of 
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of view of premises; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive, and public 
interest factors to be considered, including administrative difficulties, jury duty imposed on 
community, and local interest to decide controversy at home). 
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evaluate a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.153 This broadly 
promulgated standard and judicially created multifactor test undergirds the 
interpretation and application of § 1404(a). Its purpose is to guide judges in 
considering the fact- and context-specific nature of each case and in deciding 
whether and where to grant a transfer based on a holistic view of all the 
factors.154 Commentators and judges alike routinely describe the § 1404(a) 
inquiry as one in which the district judge can and should exercise broad 
discretion.155 
Despite these platitudes, discretion under § 1404(a) has come under attack 
from a different corner—the enforcement of forum selection clauses. Forum 
selection clauses have long posed a problem for federal litigation. It is unclear 
what legal authority a federal court sitting in diversity has to enforce a forum 
selection clause because of the Erie problem inherent in using a procedural tool 
that involves interpreting and enforcing a contract.156 This problem leads courts 
to rely on an awkward patchwork of the federal venue statutes and venue 
provisions in the FRCP as the federal law basis for applicable law.157 Even in 
non-diversity cases, courts could not agree on the proper mechanism for 
enforcing forum selection clauses.158 This confusion led to a circuit split that the 
Supreme Court resolved in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States 
 
153 For a full account of the differences between these two doctrines, see generally Robin 
Effron, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 693 
(2015). 
154 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (“A motion to transfer under 
§ 1404(a) thus calls on the district court to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific 
factors.”). 
155 See Effron, supra note 153, at 703-06 (collecting sources describing broad discretion 
under § 1404(a)). 
156 See Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
795, 802-04 (2015) (indicating that “mere existence of diversity jurisdiction” should not 
“dictate the substantive rights”). 
157 See Effron, supra note 153, at 700-01. 
158 Possibilities included §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (transfer or dismissal from improper venue), 
Rule 12(b)(3) (motion to dismiss for improper venue), and the federal common law of 
decisions such as Carnival Cruise and The Bremen. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (2012); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Scholars such as Professor Stephen 
Sachs had suggested that courts should use a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim 
for which relief can be granted. See Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 28-34, Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 
(2013) (No. 12-929) (arguing that Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be used to enforce forum 
selection clause because court inherently cannot grant relief for a claim that parties agreed 
would be litigated in another forum). The Atlantic Marine Court declined to consider this 
possibility because the question had not been raised by the parties. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 
580. 
  
2018] OUSTED 161 
 
District Court.159 In its unanimous opinion, the Court held that § 1404(a) is the 
proper mechanism for enforcing a forum selection clause when the plaintiff has 
filed a case in an otherwise proper venue.160 This holding made sense on a 
superficial level—holding otherwise would have meant that a forum selection 
clause rendered an otherwise proper venue improper, a reading that conflicts 
with the plain language and agreed meaning of the general venue statute.161 
But choosing § 1404(a) left the Court with a different problem, namely, how 
to ensure the uniform (or at least consistent) enforcement of forum selection 
clauses in federal court under a statute designed for judicial discretion and a wide 
range of outcomes under a multifactor test.162 The Court answered this challenge 
by essentially gutting the discretionary heart of § 1404(a), at least with regard to 
forum selection clauses.163 
The balancing test that courts have developed over the years for deciding 
transfer of venue includes private and public factors that are meant to flesh out 
the broad standard in the text of § 1404(a).164 The Atlantic Marine opinion 
directs courts to depart dramatically from the normal practice of “weigh[ing] the 
relevant factors and decid[ing] whether, on balance, a transfer would serve ‘the 
convenience of parties and witnesses’ and otherwise promote ‘the interest of 
justice.’”165 In his opinion, Justice Alito instructs district court judges that they 
“should not consider arguments about the parties’ private interests” because the 
court “must deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of the 
preselected forum.”166 As I observed in an earlier article, the Court essentially 
allowed private parties to fashion contract language overriding the statutory 
language that confers discretion on judges: 
According to the Court, the enforcement of a forum-selection clause is so 
paramount that it crowds out any other possible interests. . . . The Court 
thus transformed forum-selection enforcement—undoubtedly an interest 
of justice—into the only private interest cognizable under the § 1404(a) 
standard. The Court also conveniently did away with convenience. 
Although the text of § 1404(a) reads “[f]or the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice,” Justice Alito announced that “the 
interest of justice” is the “overarching consideration under § 1404(a).” He 
 
159 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013) (addressing procedure through which plaintiff can enforce 
forum selection clause). 
160 Id. at 577. 
161 Id. at 577-78 (arguing that because “[venue] cannot be ‘wrong’ if it is one in which the 
case could have been brought under § 1391,” allowing a forum selection clause to dictate 
otherwise would contradict “[t]he structure of the federal venue provisions”). 
162 For more detail on this problem, see Effron, supra note 153, at 712-17. 
163 See id. at 713. 
164 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
165 Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012)). 
166 Id. at 582 (emphasis added). 
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provided no further insight as to why such a parsing of the language is the 
best or even a plausible reading of § 1404(a).167 
Atlantic Marine thus swept away any judicial discretion to consider private 
interest factors under § 1404(a) in cases concerning forum selection clauses. The 
decision also seriously undermined a judge’s ability to exercise much discretion 
in considering the public interest factors. The public interest factors “generally 
coalesce around considerations of whether a case would clog the docket or 
burden the resources of a jurisdiction with little connection to the case, and the 
relative interests of the two forums,”168 particularly with regard to problems with 
a different forum applying new or unfamiliar law. Prior to Atlantic Marine, 
courts followed the Supreme Court’s rule from Van Dusen v. Barrack169 that a 
§ 1404(a) transferee court must use the choice of law rules of the transferor 
court.170 The fact that the transferee court might have to apply new or unfamiliar 
law was one public factor that the transferor court might weigh in deciding 
whether or not to transfer a case.171 The Atlantic Marine decision, however, 
created an exception to this rule for transfers made to enforce a forum selection 
clause, holding that in these cases, “a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry 
with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.”172 This leaves very little room 
for judges to exercise discretion in considering the public interest factors 
because “[a]ll that is left are the worries about administrative costs and burdens 
to the public, and because these factors often concern the interests of the 
transferor court, only a small number of situations remain”173 that would fall 
within the realm of the public interest factors. 
As I previously observed, Atlantic Marine transformed § 1404(a) into a 
“Multifactor Test with One Factor, [a] Balancing Test with No Balance, [a] 
Discretionary Standard with but One Permissible Outcome.”174 Although it 
might be easy to write off the forum selection clause situation as sui generis, and 
the enforcement of such clauses as a foregone conclusion, these observations 
emphatically would not have accurately depicted the state of play prior to 
Atlantic Marine. Recall that the Supreme Court based its entire justification for 
use of a federal rule to govern forum selection clause enforcement in federal 
court on its statement in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.175 that 
 
167 Effron, supra note 153, at 713-14 (quoting Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581). 
168 Id. at 715. 
169 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
170 Id. at 639 (“[T]he transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law that 
would have been applied if there had been no change of venue.”). 
171 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 584. 
172 Id. at 582. 
173 Effron, supra note 153, at 716. 
174 Id. at 717. 
175 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
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“Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern transfer within the 
federal court system,” and that “focusing on a single concern or a subset of 
factors identified in § 1404(a) would defeat that command.”176 In other words, 
the Atlantic Marine Court harnessed the power of the Stewart decision, only to 
repudiate its basic rationale. 
It is true that the standard for transfer of venue inquiries that do not involve 
forum selection clauses are unaffected by Atlantic Marine. They remain, at least 
for now, committed to the discretion of the district court within the bounds of 
§ 1404(a).177 But the transformation of § 1404(a) from a discretionary into a 
mandatory standard is still an important lesson in how private procedural 
ordering can disrupt ordinary and accepted interpretations and applications of 
procedural rules. 
Atlantic Marine also shows how the Court implicitly decided that favoring 
the parties’ access to private procedural ordering should be accomplished by 
adjusting its relationship to the counterbalance of judicial discretion, rather than 
by simply allowing parties to override a statutory default by private 
agreement.178 Recall how the Supreme Court arrived at § 1404(a) as the proper 
mechanism in the first place: the Court concluded that using § 1406(a) or Rule 
12(b)(3) would render an otherwise proper venue (as defined under § 1391) 
improper.179 However, given the pride of place that courts otherwise give to 
private procedural ordering, who is to say that the parties could not alter § 1391 
by contract? The Court did not accomplish much by avoiding that reading of 
§ 1391 because it simply displaced its discomfort with the plain language of 
§ 1391 onto an awkward reading of § 1404(a)—a reading that not only 
disregards the discretion granted in the statute, but conflicts with the Court’s 
own earlier holding that § 1404(a)’s Erie value rests precisely on its nature as a 
discretionary statute.180 It would have been easy enough to interpret § 1391 as a 
default rule subject to party modification. But the Court chose instead to utilize 
the push and pull of the private procedural ordering and judicial discretion levers 
to reach its desired result. In this case, the balance between the two values 
spelled the obliteration of judicial discretion.181 
 
176 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
177 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 (indicating that in case not involving forum selection 
clause, district court should exercise discretion under § 1404(a)). 
178 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (discussing how Court claimed to 
maintain § 1404(a) balancing test despite essentially allowing forum selection clauses to 
override § 1404(a)). 
179 Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577. 
180 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1963) (“[The] purpose [of Erie] would 
be defeated . . . if nonresident defendants . . . could invoke § 1404(a) to gain the benefits of 
the laws of another jurisdiction . . . .”). 
181 Thanks to Andrew Pollis for helping to clarify this point. 
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III. PARTY CONTROL OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION?  
OR JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROCEDURAL ORDERING? 
As the examples in Part II demonstrate, private procedural ordering has 
assumed an increasingly privileged role in federal civil procedure, and its rise 
has been accompanied by changes to the scope of procedural judicial discretion. 
While many commentators have either critiqued or lauded this development on 
the merits, few have stopped to consider why this is happening. In this Part, I 
suggest three possible explanations for this phenomenon. My suggestion is that 
the prominence of private procedural ordering goes beyond basic assumptions 
of party control and direction of litigation in the American system. Rather, the 
rise of private procedural ordering and concurrent fluctuations in the scope of 
judicial discretion show a deeper normative commitment to parties as co-
managers of litigation and co-interpreters of legal rules. 
A. The “Elevation Theory” 
One theory for the rise of private procedural ordering is simply that 
rulemakers and judges have decided to prize private procedural ordering over 
other procedural values. Several scholars who have most vigorously criticized 
the rise of privatized procedure in recent years have drawn this inference. 
Professor Dodson is the first to thoroughly critique this model on both 
descriptive and normative grounds.182 While I agree with Dodson that the private 
procedural ordering model has not necessarily achieved “dominance” over the 
competing values of judicial discretion and governing law, it is worth examining 
the elevated status of private procedural ordering. 
The examples from Part II demonstrate that the basics of the private 
procedural ordering model are one (but not the sole) foundation of the American 
adversarial litigation system, and the past few decades have provided several 
examples where fostering private procedural ordering has taken precedence over 
other values. Given this trend, it is not surprising that some scholars have 
concluded that the value of private procedural ordering currently enjoys an 
elevated status among judges and rulemakers—elevated both with respect to 
how party agreements once were viewed and in comparison to other procedural 
values. Dodson seems to agree with the first statement in the sense that he does 
not contest the trend toward the prominence of valuing private procedural 
ordering relative to where it had once been, but he does believe that the second 
part of the elevation thesis has been vastly overstated, if not downright wrong.183 
Unpacking Dodson’s arguments against the elevation theory will help clarify the 
elevation theory itself. Dodson has overstated the case against elevation, but the 
subtler and more nuanced version of the elevation theory left in Dodson’s wake 
shows that our understanding of private procedural ordering is still incomplete. 
 
182 See Dodson, supra note 1, passim (arguing party agreement is actually subordinate 
value). 
183 Id. at 13-25. 
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In that sense, he is correct to argue that elevation cannot and should not be the 
complete descriptive or normative account of the prominence of the party 
agreement model. 
Dodson argues that, even though private procedural ordering might appear to 
be powerful, especially considering its rise in recent decades, this assertion 
simply does not comport with logical inferences and empirical facts about our 
judicial system.184 Party preference is actually at the bottom of a hierarchy in 
which “judicial discretion [is] in the middle, and governing law [is] at the 
top,”185 and there are many areas in which judges still retain the power “to act 
sua sponte or in contravention of party choice.”186 These observations 
undoubtedly reinforce the important work of scholars who have sought to 
present a more complete and balanced picture of how parties are actually using 
privatized procedure in practice and how courts respond to such efforts.187 
Professor Blair, for example, has observed that most parties engage in “coarse 
pre-dispute customizations” but that “it does not appear that parties regularly 
attempt more precise [contractual] calibrations of procedure.”188 
This argument, however, gives short shrift to the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements.189 Because arbitration agreements allow parties to sidestep the 
public dispute resolution system entirely, they would appear to be a far more 
efficient way of obtaining privatized procedure. Why would parties engage in 
piecemeal and uncertain ex ante contracts around the default rules of federal 
civil procedure when they can buy themselves the procedural blank slate of 
private dispute resolution?190 Arbitration agreements thus exert an outsized 
 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 13. This is consistent with other scholars’ observation that privatized procedure 
is still confined to a few discrete areas of procedure and is relatively limited in practice, even 
by the parties who are in the best position to strike ex ante bargains for privatized procedure. 
See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 393-94 (countering conventional assumption that privatized 
procedure is widespread); Weidemaier, supra note 1, at 1887-93 (describing limited evidence 
of widespread use of procedural customization). 
186 Dodson, supra note 1, at 9. 
187 See Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection Defense, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 7 (2014) (“Courts don’t recognize these [agreements] because contract law somehow 
trumps procedure, or because the parties are somehow entitled to override whatever the law 
actually requires. Rather, our procedural law just happens to recognize a role for private 
understandings when allowing rights to be waived.” (footnote omitted)). 
188 Blair, supra note 1, at 790. 
189 By this I mean he does not give arbitration enough analytical credit, not that he does 
not sufficiently analyze arbitration. His article devotes a number of pages to a keen analysis 
of the FAA. Id. at 822-23. 
190 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party 
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1200 (2000) (stating that in 
arbitration, “party consent is the nearly exclusive guiding principle for process design” and 
parties control many aspects of process); Pollis, supra note 99, at 2104-05 (arguing that 
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effect on privatized procedure. As long as they are easily available, they provide 
an alternative to the more complicated world of retail privatized procedure. This 
means that procedural alterations will be (or will seem) easier and cheaper to 
obtain by exiting the public system entirely and engaging in alternative dispute 
resolution. Thus, evidence of widespread use of a large number and variety of 
procedural contracts in public tribunals will look artificially low. However, the 
critiques of private procedural ordering that focus almost exclusively on the 
problems with arbitration will dominate much of the discourse.191 
There is a second way in which arbitration agreements loom large in the party 
agreement picture. Although Dodson rightly points to the many areas in 
litigation in which judges can and do assert independent authority, these 
opportunities for judicial dominance disappear when parties exit the public 
dispute resolution system entirely.192 For Dodson, this fact solidifies his views 
on the general nature of party subordinance. He argues that, because party 
dominance is so clearly codified in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and 
confirmed by judicial interpretation, it is a “counterexample” to “the principle 
of party subordinance in most litigation-based contractual provisions.”193 This 
argument, however, obscures the larger point about arbitration. The enthusiasm 
with which Congress, the Supreme Court, and the lower courts have embraced 
the broad enforceability of arbitration agreements indicates the extent to which 
rulemakers and judges are happy to maintain a veneer of party subordinance in 
the courtroom, but offer a cheap ticket to the land of party dominance.194 It is 
hard to describe this in a way that does not highlight the modern elevation of the 
value of private procedural ordering, especially given that the FAA has been 
around since 1925 but expansive use and vigorous enforcement have been much 
more recent phenomena.195 
Judicial discretion cannot be fairly characterized as resting solidly atop party 
choice. Judges can and do assert their authority to override private procedural 
ordering, particularly when it comes to the use of the “inherent powers” of the 
court.196 However, these exercises of authority are complicated by counter 
examples, such as those that I presented in Part II. These are prominent examples 
of courts narrowing and limiting the availability of judicial discretion in the face 
 
pretrial disputes often prolong trial and make it costlier). 
191 But see Blair, supra note 1, at 790 (describing it as “puzzling . . . that few parties 
explore the full range of customization theoretically available to them”). 
192 Dodson, supra note 1, at 16 (arguing that judges have broad authority to override party 
waivers, forfeitures, and stipulations). 
193 Id. at 25. 
194 See Horton, supra note 20, at 456 (noting that FAA “gave firms broad discretion . . . to 
shape the path of proceedings and dictate the rules under which they must be conducted”). 
195 See id. at 444-53 (recounting history of FAA’s expansion). 
196 See Cole, supra note 190, at 1212 (observing that federal court has used its “inherent 
powers to justify mandatory participation in summary jury trials”). 
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of private procedural ordering, even when Congress appears to have intended 
that judges exercise it vigorously; this is the main lesson of the forum selection 
clause story. 
The difficulty with Dodson’s argument is that he sometimes conflates 
increased judicial intervention with robust judicial discretion. As the discovery 
example shows, the rulemakers can address perceived problems with litigant 
behavior by directly targeting judges instead of litigants.197 Despite the many 
accusations of poorly behaved litigants, the party agreement model retains pride 
of place in the 2015 amendments, backed up, as it is, by a diminished 
discretionary standard that requires tighter judicial control.198 To make this 
observation is not necessarily a criticism or a “gotcha” moment for the Advisory 
Committee. In fact, it reveals that the rulemakers believe that most parties to 
lawsuits can, do, and should regulate their own discovery processes by 
negotiation and agreement with the default rules as a framework and with 
guidance from the trial judge at a few key intervals. 
This state of affairs is subject to a few alternative interpretations. One is that 
the Advisory Committee was less convinced about the evils of party behavior 
than the rhetoric about discovery abuse suggests.199 If private procedural 
ordering is the norm and judicial intervention (through the exercise of a 
discretionary standard) is the backstop, then the rulemakers chose to adjust the 
judicial discretion backstop on the theory that most run-of-the-mill cases will be 
just fine under the private procedural ordering model, and that the backstop of 
increased judicial intervention will nudge the parties’ negotiations just enough 
in the right direction to “correct” for low-level discovery “abuses.”200 Another 
interpretation is that the Advisory Committee simply responded to political 
pressure in the rulemaking process and dropped the proposals for direct changes 
to the party-controlled aspects of discovery, such as tightening the default 
numbers of depositions, interrogatories, etc., as part of a larger compromise.201 
But a third interpretation is that, even while believing that poor party behavior 
 
197 See supra Section II.A. 
198 See supra Section II.A.2. 
199 A few scholars recently have made excellent arguments that many of our procedural 
rules and decisions are driven by disproportionate attention to “outlier” cases or litigation by 
exceptionally wealthy and well-armed litigants. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent 
Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (2016) (arguing that “one percenters” exercise 
disproportionate control over the civil litigation system much like they do “over our nation’s 
economic and political landscape”). 
200 See id. at 1010, 1041-42 (observing that addition of proportionality requirement in Rule 
26(b)(1) reflected Advisory Committee’s desire to correct discovery abuses in complex 
litigation and, although this would also affect run-of-the-mill litigation, rulemakers reasoned 
that change would be insignificant). 
201 See Moore, supra note 96, at 1122 (noting that proposals for decreasing default 
numbers of depositions and interrogatories were dropped after “fierce resistance”). 
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is largely to blame for so-called discovery abuses, it is preferable to reign in the 
ability of judges to exercise discretion rather than to tinker in any significant 
way with the party agreement model of discovery. 
This implicit recognition of a need to strike the right balance shows, however 
subtly, the elevation of private procedural ordering over that of judicial 
discretion, but it also calls into question Dodson’s model of judicial dominance 
over party preference. On one level, Dodson’s observation makes total sense—
the discovery amendments show the rulemakers asking judges to take a more 
active role in policing party behavior and scrutinizing the scope of party choice. 
But on another level, it’s not clear which value is in the driver’s seat here. 
Rulemakers and judges seem to be harnessing the tool of judicial intervention to 
enable continued private procedural ordering and limit the scope of discretion.202 
All of this is to say that neither a pure “elevation theory” nor a party 
subordinance theory completely captures what is really going on in the world of 
private procedural ordering and judicial discretion.203 
It would be wrong to say that courts and rulemakers have devoted themselves 
singularly to the task of elevating party choice and privatized procedure. At the 
same time, I cannot agree with Dodson that private procedural ordering stands 
at the bottom of a hierarchy below judicial discretion. Instead, I believe that my 
analysis in Part II shows that party agreement and judicial discretion exist in a 
dynamic relationship. For this reason, a theory beyond a simplistic “elevation 
theory” is necessary to explain the rise to prominence in party agreement. The 
following Section attempts to provide such a theory. 
B. Judges and Litigants as Co-Managers and Co-Interpreters 
As the previous Section illustrates, private procedural ordering is ascendant 
but it is difficult to place it in a rigid hierarchy with other procedural values, 
particularly judicial discretion (or its close cousin, judicial intervention). This 
dynamic relationship leaves one to puzzle over the significance of the increased 
prominence of private procedural ordering. In this Section, I propose a two-
pronged theory to explain the ascendance of private procedural ordering, one 
that suggests an evolving view of the role of both parties and judges. I propose 
 
202 See Shapiro, supra note 17 (manuscript at 34) (on file with author) (characterizing this 
as delegation of state power to litigants that is policed ex post by judicial actors). 
203 I should say a word here about the third piece of Dodson’s argument, namely, that 
governing law is at the top of the hierarchy. Although I agree with this analysis, I also believe 
that it is trivially true. Dodson spends a good deal of his article explaining that party choice 
cannot really be a dominant force because it is only via governing law that such party 
agreements and choices are respected and enforced. It is hard to argue with that point, but it 
is also true of every other contractual scheme. Parties’ abilities to contract around default rules 
or statutory schemes are always subject to the enforceability strictures of governing law, but 
that does not deprive them of significant status in creating unique legal relationships. 
Therefore, I take governing law as an assumed background condition of any legal contracting 
scheme, rather than something that has a special place at the top of a procedural hierarchy. 
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that rulemakers and judges have come to see litigants as “co-managers” of 
litigation and “co-interpreters” of procedural rules. 
As a descriptive matter, these theories provide a more complete and nuanced 
account of the role of private procedural ordering in modern litigation. But one 
might hesitate before accepting or endorsing the normative implications of these 
theories, particularly the co-interpretive theory. If the first step in the private 
procedural ordering story is to identify co-management and co-interpretation as 
a satisfactory descriptive account, the second step would be to pause before 
accepting this state of affairs as a welcome development. While the elevation 
theory is unnecessarily alarmist, somewhat inaccurate, and overstates the role 
that private procedural ordering has come to play in litigation, the co-
management and co-interpretive theories suggest that the ascendance of private 
procedural ordering and its dynamic relationship with judicial discretion have 
had a profound effect on the management of litigation and the development and 
interpretation of procedural rules. 
1. The “Co-Management” Theory 
Litigants and judges have assumed roles as co-managers of litigation. It is 
important to note that the idea of judges as managers of litigation is itself a 
modern development,204 and one that is not without controversy.205 As Professor 
Steven Gensler observed in 2010, “[j]udging changed thirty years ago. That was 
when everyday federal pretrial practice evolved to assimilate the active case-
management approach originally developed for use in cases that were protracted 
or complex.”206 With the implementation of the 1983 amendments to Rules 16 
and 26, judges assumed a more robust managerial role in the pretrial process.207 
This proactive administrative approach goes hand-in-hand with the exercise of 
judicial discretion because it is the fact-specific approach to decision-making 
 
204 Professor Resnik’s 1982 article identified and named this phenomenon and kicked off 
the modern debate. Resnik, supra note 53, at 378 (highlighting that judges have referred to 
their work as “case management” and coining term “managerial judges”). As of this 
publication it has been cited over eight hundred times. 
205 Resnik herself wrote the Managerial Judges article to criticize this practice. Id. at 380 
(“In short, managerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes 
rational, fair, and impartial adjudication.”). In the following three decades, a vigorous 
scholarly debate has developed over descriptive accounts of the phenomenon and normative 
evaluations of the practice. Professor Gensler provides an excellent summary and survey of 
these arguments. Gensler, supra note 90, at 678-80 (describing Resnik’s critiques of, and 
Congress’s statutory support of, judicial case-management techniques). 
206 Gensler, supra note 90, at 670 (footnote omitted). 
207 See id. at 676-77 (arguing that 1983 amendments represent “turning point” of increased 
judicial involvement in case management). 
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that allows judges to manage litigation on a case-by-case and day-to-day 
basis.208 
Thus, the standard narrative that has emerged in the past three decades is that 
judges have transformed from relatively hands-off background players in 
pretrial process209 to active managers of discovery and other pretrial activities. 
While this is undoubtedly a true account of the rise of managerial judging, it is 
interesting to lay this story side-by-side with the narrative of the rise of party 
agreement and private procedural ordering. In roughly the same time period that 
judges became “managerial,” parties became “procedural contractors,” with 
courts and rulemakers eagerly embracing and encouraging this activity. This is 
the core of the “co-management” thesis: litigation became something that 
needed to be managed, and judges and parties each assumed increasingly 
prominent roles in such management. 
The analysis of civil discovery in Section II.A contains the most direct 
example of co-management. The text of the rules (particularly Rules 16 and 26), 
as well as their applications and interpretations, instruct the judges to manage 
pretrial process and direct the litigants to cooperate, plan, and execute much of 
the discovery process outside of the courthouse itself.210 One way of viewing 
this directive is to see judges as an additional party to the litigants’ agreements 
of private procedural ordering.211 Another way of viewing this relationship 
structure is to see parties as additional managers to pretrial litigation. These 
views are not mutually exclusive. In fact, exploring both angles highlights the 
dynamic interplay of judicial discretion and private procedural ordering in the 
discovery process. Professor Richard Freer views this as “an embarrassing 
minimization of traditional judicial functions” because it shows a movement 
toward a world in which “district judges are not meant to ‘adjudicate’ or even 
‘resolve’ cases, but . . . merely to ‘assist in the resolution’ of cases.”212 But 
perhaps co-management simply reflects a world in which case management 
itself is new, and the traditional judicial functions of the judge are those outside 
of the managerial and administrative realm. 
The administration of civil discovery is a relatively straightforward example 
of co-management. Co-management is baked into the text and structure of the 
 
208 See Kim, supra note 51, at 412 (arguing that discretion is inevitably part of judicial 
decision-making because law cannot “anticipat[e] future scenarios in which a rule of decision 
might be required”). 
209 This, of course, was with the exception of the standard “big legal” moments in pretrial 
practice of motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and adjudication of 
jurisdictional issues. 
210 FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26 (discussing pretrial conferences and duty to disclose). 
211 See Bone, supra note 4, at 1340 (describing judges’ case-management as “resembl[ing] 
a three-party contract”). 
212 Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 
EMORY L.J. 1491, 1510 (2016). 
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discovery rules themselves, and leads to the dynamic interplay of private 
procedural ordering and judicial discretion described in Section II.A, in which 
neither value truly dominates because each places a check on the other. Thanks 
to the backstop of robust judicial involvement, including the exercise of a good 
deal of discretion, the prominence of the party agreement model persists, even 
if that discretion might be narrower than what managerial judges once 
enjoyed.213 But because co-management might then be a feature unique to 
discovery, we must search for other examples of co-management. 
Settlement is another example of co-management in action. As the description 
of class action settlement fairness hearings under Rule 23(e) shows, district court 
judges have been hesitant to take firm control of class action settlements to 
conduct the sort of searching fairness hearings that would result in more frequent 
rejections of proposed settlements.214 This behavior looks quite deferential, 
especially considering the counter-narrative of managerial judging in the realm 
of complex litigation. It makes more sense, however, under the co-management 
theory. 
Class action settlements are extraordinarily complex and fact specific, and 
judges thus operate with an information deficit. This deficit alone should not 
justify deference to or co-management with litigants, as judges are frequently 
called upon to evaluate complex and difficult factual situations when making 
other legal decisions, for example, at summary judgment. But class action 
settlements have a particular administrative aspect—the value of the settlement 
is linked to how it will be structured and administered.215 Indeed, the 
administration of settlements is a complex enough task that it is generally farmed 
out to firms that specialize in the task.216 When judges exhibit what appear to be 
timid tendencies toward strong involvement in evaluating settlements, it might 
be the administrative aspect of settlement that drives their reticence. In other 
words, the structure of Rule 23(e) is somewhat at odds with how it is actually 
practiced. Rule 23(e) suggests a neatly divided two-step process: first, the 
litigants use party agreement to negotiate a settlement; then, the judge evaluates 
 
213 See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text (discussing that while trial judges had 
“discretion to broaden the scope of discovery,” amendments to discovery rules have now 
encouraged cooperation between litigants). 
214 See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (discussing how judges have to balance 
fairness hearings and presumed fairness of proposed settlements). 
215 See Rubenstein, supra note 120, at 1439-40 (explaining that judge, through “two-part 
fairness hearing,” will assess “the value of the claims and regulatory assessment of the process 
of settlement”). 
216 See Allison Frankel, 3rd Circuit Appeal Throws Light on Shadowy Class Action Claims 
Process, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/10/08/3rd-
circuit-appeal-throws-light-on-shadowy-class-action-claims-process/ 
[http://perma.cc/VXX7-ATJ5] (discussing role of class action administration firms in 
administration and settlement of class actions). 
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that settlement under the 23(e) fairness standard.217 In practice, however, the 
process is not so neatly divided. Instead, the parties and judge are involved in a 
more dynamic process in which they are jointly tasked with devising the 
settlement and ensuring some degree of fairness in its terms and administration. 
The settlement example extends beyond class actions and beyond a story of 
weak judicial involvement where discretion might have been stronger. In 
Section II.B, I described the long history of settlements being free of judicial 
oversight. This narrative, however, needs some refinement. Although there is a 
strong tradition of settlements being free of judicial approval, judicial 
involvement is another story altogether. In fact, one of the criticisms of 
managerial judging and the 1983 amendments to Rules 16 and 26 is that they 
encourage judges to take an active role in promoting and brokering party 
settlements.218 Throughout the pretrial process, judges, encouraged by both rules 
and the trends of modern practice to be an active participant in settlement 
negotiations between the parties, often take on a role that looks more like 
mediator than umpire.219 Sometimes judges even go beyond the role of mediator 
and drift into arm-twisting and other pressure tactics to broker a settlement.220 
This is evidence of the two-way street of the co-management theory. While 
examples like class action settlement fairness hearings indicate that judges invite 
litigants to be co-managers of a delegated judicial function, other examples, such 
as judges’ pretrial involvement, show judges managing a process that is 
ostensibly the province of private party agreement. 
The enforcement of forum selection clauses provides one of the strongest 
challenges to the coherence of the co-management theory. As I detailed in 
Section II.C, the Supreme Court in Atlantic Marine viewed broad judicial 
discretion and party agreement as more or less incompatible values and held that 
judges’ discretion must give way to private procedural ordering when it comes 
to decision-making under the federal transfer of venue statute. Again, it is worth 
emphasizing that this reasoning was not foreordained by prior Supreme Court 
analysis; when the Court first held that federal procedural law could be used to 
trump state laws that limited the enforceability of forum selection clauses, 
Justice Marshall pointed to the discretionary nature of § 1404(a) as the very basis 
for his holding and stressed the “flexible and individualized analysis Congress 
 
217 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
218 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 190, at 1212-14 (noting inherent powers of court to facilitate 
settlement); Resnik, supra note 53, at 399-403 (describing possibility of bias in judicial 
involvement in settlement negotiations); Laura M. Warshawsky, Comment, Objectivity and 
Accountability: Limits on Judicial Involvement in Settlement, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 369, 371-
74 (discussing dangers of coercion with judicial involvement in settlement negotiations). 
219 See Warshawsky, supra note 218, at 371 (describing judicial involvement in settlement 
negotiations). 
220 Id. at 372 (explaining concern about how judges in role of mediator and adjudicator 
may still be biased and try to force settlement). 
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prescribed in § 1404(a).”221 Such an example might tempt one back into 
adopting the elevation theory. 
Curiously, however, § 1404(a) also contains a great example of the recent 
codification of the co-management theory. In the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011,222 Congress amended § 1404(a) to permit 
transfer “to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”223 Of 
course, it had long been the case that parties could consent to any venue prior to 
a lawsuit using a forum selection clause.224 Absent a forum selection clause, 
however, the Supreme Court had interpreted § 1404(a) to bar the transfer of 
cases to districts that did not have an independent basis of personal jurisdiction 
and venue.225 Congress decided to eliminate this barrier so that parties could 
consent to a transfer “even if the action could not have been brought in that 
district or division originally.”226 Although the express purpose of the 
amendment was to abrogate the holding in Hoffman, it is notable that the text of 
§ 1404(a) now includes an express invitation for parties to use private procedural 
ordering to choose a venue during the life of the lawsuit.227 This encouragement 
now sits side-by-side with the rest of § 1404(a), which grants district judges 
(purportedly) broad discretion to make transfer of venue decisions. 
Section 1404(a) might then be one of the best encapsulations of the co-
management theory and its attendant difficulties. It directs judges to take an 
active managerial role by using broad discretion to make case-specific decisions 
about venue, and invites litigants to come to an agreement about an optimal 
venue, even if such venue would otherwise be improper. Yet the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute now contains the puzzling example of vanishing 
discretion in the face of forum selection clauses. In one statute we find that 
rulemakers are eager to promote co-management, but the idea of co-
management does not prevent judges from finding that private procedural 
ordering and judicial discretion sometimes make for an uncomfortable fit. 
The above examples show that courts and rulemakers have been moving 
toward a co-management model of litigation, but not without troubling conflicts. 
Moreover, these examples exist alongside plenty of other instances of old-
fashioned judicial decision-making that would be hard to characterize as 
 
221 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). 
222 Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758. 
223 § 204, 125 Stat. at 764 (emphasis added). 
224 See Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 28-29 (holding that “28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)[] governs 
the parties’ venue dispute” and using that statute to find that parties’ forum selection clause 
was enforceable). 
225 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960) (explaining that under § 1404(a), 
power of district court to transfer claim to another district is limited by whether action “might 
have been brought” by plaintiff in that other district). 
226 H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 24 (2011). 
227 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
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managerial, let alone “co-managerial.” Prior to 1983, any “co-management” 
theory would have been completely foreign because no one viewed ordinary 
cases as “litigation” that needed to be “managed.”228 As judges asserted their 
power and inserted themselves into the administrative and substantive details of 
pretrial practice, commentators warned that these practices were less visible, a 
judge’s reasoning was less transparent, and the managerial approach provided 
too many opportunities to use discretionary decisions as a vehicle for achieving 
a judge’s desired substantive legal outcomes. 
Notice that the co-management theory does not necessarily allay any or all of 
these concerns. Private procedural ordering does not make judicial reasoning 
more visible, transparent, precedential, or consistent. In fact, private procedural 
ordering has itself been criticized on precisely these grounds, with the added 
worry that when parties make these decisions in private and outside of a public 
tribunal, they are in some way “ousting” or diluting the power of the federal 
courts.229 In other words, co-management might dilute the power that either the 
judge or the parties have in controlling public decisions and outcomes about 
procedural decisions, but it does little to address these real and significant 
concerns. 
2. The “Co-Interpretive” Theory 
The co-interpretive theory posits that judges are not the sole interpreters of 
some procedural rules. Instead, they share interpretive authority with litigants. 
For obvious reasons, this theory is far more limited in scope than the co-
management theory, and is also more controversial. Although both judges and 
litigants have always tended to the administrative tasks of case management in 
one way or another, the job of interpreting and applying the law is soundly in 
the judicial province. In a trivial sense, litigants have always been “co-
interpreters” of the law to the extent that they shape judicial reasoning and 
opinions by framing the facts and legal arguments in their briefs and oral 
arguments. What I am suggesting here is that, in limited circumstances, litigants 
are co-interpreters of rules in a much more direct manner than this; namely, that 
the relationship between private procedural ordering and judicial discretion 
reveals a tacit admission that, in a few procedural areas, litigants have assumed 
some interpretive authority over procedural rules. 
The task of locating interpretive authority for procedural rules in federal 
courts is already complex, even prior to introducing the idea of co-interpretation. 
Some procedural rules featured in this Article were promulgated by Congress 
and codified in the U.S. Code,230 while others were judicially promulgated 
 
228 See supra notes 207, 218 and accompanying text (explaining changes made in 1983). 
229 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting “older form of ouster doctrine”). 
230 For example, the transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
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products of federal common law.231 These rules are subject to the traditional (if 
controversial in their own right) interpretive methods as other statutes and 
common law rules. The FRCP, however, present special interpretive problems 
because their promulgator, the Supreme Court, is the same body that has 
terminal interpretive authority over them,232 and their drafter, the Advisory 
Committee, consists of federal judges who will be future interpreters of the rules. 
This complication should not be overstated for purposes of this Article. After 
all, I am proposing that the co-interpretive theory applies to several procedural 
rules, only some of which are found in the FRCP. However, it is important to 
note that, as far as the FRCP are concerned, courts are already in the unique 
position of interpreting rules that have been drafted and promulgated by various 
members of the judiciary. 
In this sense, the interpretation of the FRCP has a good deal in common with 
the interpretative efforts of administrative agencies in which Congress has 
tasked administrators with promulgating, interpreting, and applying a set of rules 
that govern their given area of administration.233 In the case of courts, where the 
administrative and managerial function of judges has grown in prominence, 
these judges-qua-litigation administrators are the analogues of other government 
 
231 For example, the enforceability of forum selection clauses in non-diversity cases. Supra 
note 10. 
232 This authority is delegated in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). The 
Supreme Court uses a set of advisory and rules committees to draft rules and rule amendments. 
See id. § 2073(a). After the Supreme Court approves the rules, it reports to Congress by the 
following May 1st. See id. § 2074. Unless Congress takes specific action, the new or amended 
rules go into effect on December 1st of that year. See id. Several scholars have written 
comprehensive accounts of the rulemaking process and the rule of the judicial conference and 
advisory committees. See Joseph P. Bauer, Shiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the 
Supreme Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 720, 727 (1988) (“The reality of rulemaking is that the Supreme Court itself did not, 
and still does not, actually draft the Rules.”); David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive 
Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 931-32 
(explaining process under Rules Enabling Act and role of Supreme Court, Congress, and 
Advisory Committee); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1049-50 (1993) (noting Court’s 
power to promulgate rules under Rules Enabling Act and Supersession Clause); Catherine T. 
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1105-06 (2002) (explaining that Rules Enabling Act orginially identified 
only two decision makers, Supreme Court and Congress, but that Court started to employ 
Advisory Committee). 
233 See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil 
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1190 (2012) 
(addressing question of whether Supreme Court should promulgate procedural rules through 
adjudication or more formal rulemaking). 
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regulators.234 This interpretive complication is already a wrinkle on the 
traditional story of legal interpretation in which judges enjoy relatively exclusive 
authority over the interpretation of legislatively enacted materials. The co-
interpretive theory goes further by suggesting that rule interpretation is not 
uniquely the province of a traditional judge or even an administrator, but that 
regulated parties who are not judicial actors have an explicit role to play in 
interpretation that extends beyond mere participation in the form of oral or 
written advocacy.235 
Perhaps the easiest way to explain co-interpretation is by way of illustration. 
In the following two subsections, I give two examples of co-interpretation in 
practice. They show that the conditions for co-interpretation exist in either of 
two circumstances: when there has been an implicit delegation of interpretive 
authority, or where there is surprising deference to litigant interpretations of a 
rule. 
a. Co-Interpretation Through Delegation 
Co-interpretation through delegation is when rulemakers have structured a 
procedural rule to delegate interpretive authority to litigants alongside judges. 
One example of co-interpretation via implicit delegation is in the rule governing 
the scope of discovery.236 In the course of normal litigation, litigants are the first 
parties to make decisions about the scope of discovery—that is, to interpret what 
is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense” and, since December 2015, what it 
means for the cost of discovery to be “proportional to the needs of the case.”237 
Litigants reveal their interpretations through the discovery requests they make 
to other parties and through their decisions about what material to disclose to 
their adversaries. That is, they take the first interpretive cut at the meaning of the 
rule in their particular case. Although this interpretation clearly takes place in 
the shadow of any judicial decision that comes after a challenge, the structure of 
the rule still suggests co-interpretation because judicial resolution to discovery 
disputes are meant to be the exception rather than the norm. Parties are 
encouraged to make their own decisions and agreements about disclosable 
materials, and these decisions are left undisturbed in the absence of a call for 
judicial resolution.238 
 
234 Id. at 1202-05 (describing analogy between administrative agencies and courts in “civil 
procedure context”). 
235 The closest analogue to this might be the practice of negotiated rulemaking in 
administrative law. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2012). However, I am suggesting a particular 
interpretive role for parties, and not necessarily a role in promulgating formal written rules 
themselves. 
236 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
237 Id. 
238 Here again, class actions provide a nice foil for the workings of ordinary litigation. One 
of the concerns about the management of class actions is that lawyers might be all too happy 
  
2018] OUSTED 177 
 
The world of discovery is a world of numerous decisions, large and small, 
that will impact the direction and outcome of litigation. In the same way that a 
trial judge makes frequent (and often spontaneous) decisions about evidentiary 
and other procedural matters on the record during a trial or at pretrial hearings, 
litigants engaged in discovery must constantly make decisions or resolve 
disputes about what sort of material or conduct is permissible within the 
boundaries of the federal rules. In fact, the time spent in discovery far outweighs 
the time that most litigants will ever spend in front of a judge.239 It is simply not 
possible for a judicial officer to oversee or adjudicate each of these interpretive 
decisions or negotiations about the boundaries and meaning of the discovery 
rules. Rather, the parties are the ones that engage in the ongoing process of rule 
interpretation and application. 
The fact that judges can and do involve themselves in rule interpretation via 
the resolution of some discovery disputes does not change the fact that the 
parties, without judicial intervention, are making the vast majority of 
interpretive decisions about discovery. Many of these actions and decisions are 
stunningly mundane, but that fact does not take away from the co-interpretive 
theory. In the courtroom, many of the rulings from the bench made by a judge 
are similarly mundane, relatively uncontroversial, and unlikely to be reviewed 
by a higher court.240 But one would not say that the judge is not performing her 
judicial function of interpretation and application of rules by making such 
rulings.241 Similarly, the breadth of decisions made by parties during discovery 
ranges from the very routine to the more controversial, and not every discovery 
action will entail judicial resolution, even if it is on the more controversial side. 
 
to engage in lengthy and costly discovery, to the extent that the claimants (and even 
defendants) are too removed from the action and cannot exert proper discipline over their 
lawyers. This is one of the justifications for increased managerial judicial involvement in the 
pretrial processes of class actions (or other mass actions) as compared to ordinary discovery 
in ordinary cases. 
239 See Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the 
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1332-35 (2005). 
240 Effron, supra note 2, at 701-08 (describing procedural devices that are effectively 
insulated from appellate review). 
241 In fact, Professor Elizabeth Porter has proposed a theory of interpretation of the FRCP 
in which the Supreme Court has engaged in “managerial interpretation,” a method of 
interpretation in which the Court uses equitable principles and theory to make case and fact-
specific decisions about the interpretation of rules. Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 
101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 136-42 (2015). She suggests that when engaged in this type of 
interpretation, the Supreme Court should defer to the fact and interpretive decisions of 
managerial district court judges. Id. at 175-78. This deference suggests models of 
interpretation in which the “highest” judicial or interpretive authority should not necessarily 
be the final or only word on interpretation, and that for some procedural rules interpretation 
is an ongoing, dynamic, and multiparty process. 
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In this world of discovery, the parties have interpretive authority not only 
because of the number of effectively unreviewed interpretive decisions, but 
because the lawyers engaged in discovery are repeat players in the litigation 
process. This means that when the parties are making their interpretive decisions 
about the boundaries or meanings of the rules, they are really bargaining in the 
shadow of two outside sources of information. The more obvious source is 
written judicial opinions on the rules, or accumulated observations about judicial 
behavior toward certain issues. The other source is the accumulated wisdom 
about how given parties behave and have behaved with regard to the 
interpretation and application of the rules. These norms do not emanate directly 
from any judicial or statutory source, but they undoubtedly influence how parties 
interpret the boundaries of the rules and how they reach negotiated decisions 
with their adversaries about rule boundaries. This accumulated experience and 
wisdom become sources, albeit diffuse, of interpretive authority. 
This state of affairs reflects a deliberate decision by rulemakers to delegate 
interpretive authority to the parties because the structure of discovery sets the 
default of decision-making and action with the litigants rather than with a 
judicial officer. One could imagine a different world of discovery that is 
designed to avoid co-interpretation. In this world, discovery would take place 
entirely within the close supervision of a judicial officer, perhaps one of a large 
corps of magistrate judges.242 Alternatively, it would be a world in which 
rulemakers promulgate a set of rules that are far more detailed and specific than 
the current discovery rules. In this scenario, the possibilities for party 
interpretation would be much narrower, and a set of detailed and nitpicky rules 
would necessitate far more frequent judicial intervention. 
The key question here is why I characterize the discovery rules in particular 
as “co-interpretative,” when the law is replete with instances of party decisions 
that will stand unless formally challenged—a principle that lies at the heart of 
most waiver and forfeiture doctrines.243 I believe that the discovery rules are 
different because the rulemakers have designed a system in which the parties are 
not just expected, but almost obligated to make interpretive decisions about the 
scope of the rules. Moreover, although judicial resolution is available, it is not 
the expected culmination of litigant decisions. Resorting to judicial intervention 
in discovery is not just occasional, but is the expressly disfavored outcome of 
discovery disputes. Waiver doctrine, on the other hand, functions more as a 
 
242 See generally Kessler, supra note 59 (describing alternative models of discovery and 
pretrial litigation that might have emerged out of “our quasi-inquisitorial equity tradition”). 
243 For example, parties waive the right to invoke evidentiary privileges if they disclose 
otherwise privileged material, leading to a complicated network of waiver doctrines. See 
Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 
1607 (1986) (“Thus focused, the principal concern is selective use of privileged material to 
garble the truth, which mandates giving the opponent access to related privileged material to 
set the record straight.”). 
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penalty for failing to take the expected steps to ask a court to resolve a question 
of law. 
Discovery, however, has a different structure; in ordinary circumstances, the 
parties are expected to agree on an interpretation of the rule and live with that 
outcome unless, and until, they reach an impasse and need a second interpreter—
the judge. Just because the judge has the final interpretive authority does not 
mean that the parties have not been given some significant initial interpretive 
powers that govern the course of their litigation. Similarly, just because the 
parties’ interpretations do not carry precedential value does not mean that they 
are doing interpretive work. Many of the discretionary decisions made by 
judges, particularly in pretrial orders, are unwritten or are short summary orders 
that are of little or no value to future litigants or judges looking to use prior cases 
as precedent or a guide for future decisions. In other words, interpretive status 
does not depend on the future authoritative weight of any given decision. 
b. Co-Interpretation Through Deference 
As the discovery example shows, co-interpretation can be the result of an 
implicit delegation of interpretive authority to litigants via the systemic design 
of a set of rules. Co-interpretation can also emerge through patterns of judicial 
behavior in which judges constrain their own exercise of discretion by deferring 
to the private procedural ordering actions of litigants. Inherent in such actions 
are interpretive conclusions about the meaning and application of a procedural 
rule. The two examples of co-interpretation by deference are in class action 
settlement fairness hearings and in the enforcement of forum selection clauses 
in § 1404(a) transfers. 
Section II.B.1 of this Article documented how many judges are notably 
hesitant to engage in the sort of robust fairness hearing followed by a settlement 
denial that many commentators have hoped would result from Rule 23(e)(2).244 
This reveals that judges are actually exercising a sort of deference to the parties’ 
settlement decision, not just deference to the factual grounding of the settlement, 
but also to the parties’ conclusion of what is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 
under the 23(e) standard.245 
A settlement agreement is, at heart, a bargain, and courts tend to proceed from 
the assumption that an agreement that is free of fraud, coercion, or overweening 
is presumptively fair and adequate, even if other parties might have come to 
different conclusions or different numbers.246 The limited availability of 
unconscionability doctrine in traditional contract law shows the extent to which 
judicial actors are hesitant to upset presumptively adequate or reasonable 
 
244 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
245 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
246 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (“There are compelling 
reasons why a freely negotiated private . . . agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, 
or overweening bargaining power, . . . should be given full effect.” (footnote omitted)). 
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bargains.247 Unconscionability traditionally has been divided into “procedural” 
and “substantive” doctrines.248 Procedural unconscionability refers to contracts 
that are unenforceable because of unacceptable “unfairness in the formation of 
the contract,” and substantive unconscionability refers to contracts that are 
unenforceable because of “excessively disproportionate terms.”249 While 
unconscionability is not a widely used tool for finding contracts unenforceable, 
the doctrine of procedural unconscionability has been used with a limited 
amount of success in a few jurisdictions, particularly with regards to contracts 
of adhesion.250 A pure finding of substantive unconscionability—a bare 
assertion that the terms of the contract are simply unfair with no reference to the 
bargaining process—are rare.251 
It is no surprise, then, that a directive for a judge to scrutinize a bargain for 
fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness makes for an uncomfortable fit. This is 
especially true when the judge has been involved in the process that leads to the 
settlement agreement in the form of managing the litigation.252 The judge might 
also believe that she has been able to influence the content of the settlement 
through information-forcing mechanisms inherent in litigation management.253 
 
247 See Brett M. Becker & John R. Sechrist II, Note, Claims of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of the Prevailing Analysis in North Carolina, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 633, 
634 (2014) (explaining that “unconscionability is a contract theory that rarely prevails.”). 
248 Id. at 635. 
249 Id. at 636 (quoting Sitogum Holdings, Inc., v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 921 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)); see also Larry DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of 
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1072-
75 (2006) (discussing doctrinal history of procedural and substantive unconscionability). 
250 See Sierra David Sterkin, Comment, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A 
Consumer’s Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 297 (2004). 
251 See Becker & Sechrist, supra note 247, at 641 (“Courts require both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability and will typically find substantive unconscionability after 
finding procedural unconscionability.” (emphasis omitted)); Craig Horowitz, Note, Reviving 
the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 946 
(1986) (“Courts usually invoke substantive unconscionability in conjunction with procedural 
unconscionability to invalidate a contract.”). 
252 See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (explaining how modern trends and 
amendments to FRCP have pushed judges into taking active role in settlement negotiations). 
This is certainly less true of settlement classes in which the parties ask for both certification 
and settlement simultaneously. In these situations, the judge has had far less (if any) 
managerial involvement with the parties. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement 
Class Actions, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 981-82 (2014) (explaining implications of parties 
simultaneously proposing certification and settlement on litigation process). 
253 See Bradt & Rave, supra note 144, at 1265 (explaining unique features of federal 
multidistrict litigation and how “information-forcing intermediary function grows naturally 
out of the []judge’s position”); Jaros & Zimmerman, supra note 144, at 551-52 (noting that 
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In this sense, co-management has led to co-interpretation. The judge, having 
sufficient faith in the bargaining and litigation process that resulted in a 
settlement proposal, is willing to take seriously the parties’ own assessment that 
a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. This sort of deference does not 
mean that the judge has cast aside her role as interpreter of Rule 23(e)—she will 
still conduct a hearing and make her own findings. But the timidity described in 
Section II.B.1 reflects co-interpretation. Although the judge will not defer 
automatically and absolutely to the parties’ assessment, she is accounting for the 
parties’ conclusions of fairness when making her own. Moreover, that timidity 
fades when judges make settlement decisions that are not so much related to the 
fairness of the bargain, but concern the court’s own authority. For example, the 
Fifth Circuit rejected the enforcement of a settlement agreement that appeared 
to include putative class members who “had not sustained losses at all, or had 
sustained losses unrelated to [the mass accident subject of the class action].”254 
The court reasoned that the parties could not use the vehicle of class settlement 
to compensate for claims that could not have been pled in the first place.255 So 
while judges might constrain their discretion and defer to parties on the question 
of interpreting “fairness” within the meaning of Rule 23, the last vestiges of what 
used to be the ouster doctrine will motivate a court to reassert its authority when 
the nature of a valid claim is at issue. 
Let me be clear about the descriptive nature of this claim. I am in no way 
suggesting that the use of co-interpretation by deference in the interpretation and 
application of Rule 23(e) is normatively desirable, or even authorized by the text 
and structure of Rule 23. Scholars have criticized judicial timidity in some Rule 
23(e) decisions because they believe that judges are complicit in authorizing 
settlements that, at best, undercompensate plaintiff classes, and, at worst, enrich 
class action lawyers at the expense of both compensation to plaintiffs and 
fairness to potentially overpaying defendants.256 This suggests that if the 
rulemakers are concerned about policing the fairness of class action settlements, 
then Rule 23(e) is a misguided choice. Leading, as it has, to deference driven 
co-interpretation, perhaps the rulemakers should invest more heavily on the case 
 
there is no “theoretical foundation for judges to supervise aggregate settlement” and therefore 
role of judicial review should be to “alert and press other institutions . . . to reform their 
institutional approach to settling cases”). 
254 In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d 326, 343 (5th Cir. 2013). 
255 Id. at 344. 
256 See Erichson, supra note 120, at 2011-15 (discussing role of judges in process and 
noting that judges are failing to fully use inquisitorial tools); Grabill, supra note 114, at 126 
(indicating that courts have struggled to exert judicial authority in mass tort settlements); 
Lahav, supra note 118, at 86 (criticizing how courts review fairness of settlements and how 
this affects preferences of class members); Rubenstein, supra note 120, at 1446 (noting that 
judges could be more “efficacious at the fairness hearing stage”). 
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management end and demand better process based bargaining, rather than 
substantive evaluations of outcomes. 
Beyond class action settlements, this Article contains an example of co-
interpretation that may have gone too far. As outlined in Section II.C, the 
Supreme Court has gutted judicial discretion to make transfer of venue decisions 
under § 1404(a) in the presence of a presumptively valid forum selection clause. 
In Atlantic Marine, the Court instructed judges to consider only one factor in a 
supposedly multifactor test—the fact that the parties have made a presumptively 
valid agreement to litigate the case in a particular forum.257 The idea of co-
interpretation is evident in Justice Alito’s opinion which explains that the forum 
selection agreement itself already contains the parties’ assessments of the private 
interest factors that a judge would normally consider in deciding a transfer of 
venue motion.258 Thus, this agreement requires complete deference by the 
district judge, who should not replace or enhance the parties’ analysis with her 
own. While this is technically co-interpretation insofar as the Court allows the 
judge a narrow area in which to consider very limited public interest factors,259 
the Court all but acknowledges that it is requiring nearly total deference to the 
parties’ assessment of the optimal forum. It is one thing to announce a general 
policy of favoring forum selection clauses, as the Court did in Stewart.260 It is 
another thing entirely to suggest that forum selection clauses are so powerful as 
to displace almost any opportunity for the judge to exercise her discretion, given 
explicitly in a statute, to conduct independent scrutiny of a transfer of venue 
motion. This is hardly co-interpretation; rather, it is ceding the interpretation of 
a statute almost entirely to contracting parties, usually at a time when they are 
not engaged in a live dispute and often do not anticipate that they ever will be. 
Co-interpretation, to the extent that it is a normatively desirable practice at all, 
should reflect a dynamic interplay between judge and parties. A regime of 
extreme deference demonstrates the potential for a very slippery slope. 
The co-interpretive theory is clearly much narrower than the co-management 
theory, explaining far fewer instances of difficulties in the relationship between 
private procedural ordering and judicial discretion. Nevertheless, it is significant 
that in a few situations, rulemakers and judges seem to be comfortable with 
litigants sharing the job of rule interpretation, just as they appear now to share 
the task of case management. To the extent that co-interpretation is an even more 
radical departure from traditional allocations of authority than co-management, 
its use should be acknowledged and its normative implications further explored. 
 
257 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013). 
258 Id. at 581-83 (explaining that because valid forum selection clause has been bargained 
for, private-interests are present). 
259 Id. at 582. 
260 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988) (asking district court to 
consider factors under § 1404(a)). 
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C. Co-Management, Co-Interpretation, and the Nature of Adversarialism 
The relationship between private procedural ordering and judicial discretion 
has created two new dynamics of civil litigation: co-management and co-
interpretation. The emergence of co-management and co-interpretation is 
evidence of how judges and litigants are grappling with a changing litigation 
landscape in the American adversarial system, which is characterized by norms 
of party control and passive judging.261 According to the standard narrative, 
parties exploit procedure and forum in an adversarial system to produce a record 
of facts and arguments of law, and from those clashing accounts, the parties can 
expect clarity and finality.262 Judges are not active in the production of such facts 
or the generation of legal arguments. Rather, they are passive players whose 
active work is in response to the actions of the litigants in an unfolding dramatic 
battle.263 The adversarial system is most often contrasted with the inquisitorial 
system in most European countries, a system in which the judge actively controls 
and directs the factual and legal path of the litigation.264 
 
261 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 120, at 2012 (indicating that American adversarial 
system is party-oriented); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 830 (1985) (comparing German procedural system to Anglo-American 
procedural world, including “partisan presentation of evidence to a passive and ignorant tier”); 
Franklin Strier, What Can the American Adversary System Learn from an Inquisitorial System 
of Justice?, 76 JUDICATURE 109, 109 (1992) (outlining characteristics of adversary system, 
including “decision making by lay jurors” and “party-controlled procedures”). 
262 See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 1, 23-24 (1997) (“Among the most admirable features of American court 
procedure is that it does promote multiple perspectives through the adversary control of the 
process.”); Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 735-36 (1987) (comparing German and American systems with regard 
to pretrial discovery); John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage 
in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 990 (1990) (explaining that in Germany “judge 
plays the central role in building the record of the witnesses’ testimony, and the parties’ 
attorneys are quite restricted in what they can do to influence the shape of that record”); Robert 
S. Thompson, Decision, Disciplined Inferences, and the Adversary Process, 13 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 725, 737 (1991) (“Adversarial adjudication . . . places an emphasis on participation of 
the parties through their advocates affording the opportunity to persuade to an impressionistic 
individualized decision.”). 
263 See Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45 AKRON L. 
REV. 647, 658-68 (2012) (describing history and nature of adversarial justice in Anglo-
American tradition). 
264 Thompson, supra note 262, at 740 (explaining inquisitorial system as “while requiring 
neutrality of the judge, allocates to her an active role”); see also David Alan Sklansky, Anti-
Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1635-36 (2009) (contrasting adversarial and 
inquisitorial models in criminal law context). 
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Scholars have, of course, contested this simplistic descriptive account of 
American adversarial legal norms.265 Particularly in the realm of complex 
litigation, the active role of the managerial judge is a serious challenge to the 
traditional adversarial ideal.266 But even in the more tempered view, the basic 
adversarial model still holds—parties assume the burden of producing factual 
and legal materials, and do so in a competitive environment that relies on a 
neutral and relatively removed (if not entirely passive) adjudicator. 
What is interesting about co-management and co-interpretation is that they 
are anti-adversarial trends that move beyond the adversarial/inquisitorial binary. 
Take, for example, the adversarial norm of party control of litigation. Private 
procedural ordering is, on the one hand, completely emblematic of party control. 
After all, it is parties that are not just running the conveyer belt of litigation, but 
constructing the machinery alongside it.267 Agreements by parties to modify 
procedural rules made by rulemakers and judges is clearly party control. On the 
other hand, private procedural ordering, with its emphasis on party agreement 
(however fictional), is the antithesis of adversarial. In this model, party control 
does not serve the larger function of producing a clash of information that will 
result in a procedurally (or even substantively) acceptable outcome, but instead 
rests on the notion that the parties can be the co-authors of their own bespoke 
tribunal.268 
Procedural judicial discretion also fits uncomfortably within the adversarial 
norm. As many commentators have noted, the growth in procedural discretion 
has accompanied the rise of the managerial judge. But this also fits outside of 
the adversarial/inquisitorial binary. When rulemakers carve out a larger role for 
judges in a process like discovery, this does not push toward a genuinely 
inquisitorial model of marshalling information.269 Instead, judges function more 
as gatekeepers of adversarialism, using their discretion to either push the parties 
back toward private ordering or fashion individual remedies. And when courts 
 
265 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The Evolution of American Civil Trial Process Towards 
Greater Congruence with Continental Trial Practice, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 125, 126 
(1999) (stating that there are “significant trends that defy [the adversarial and inquisitorial] 
paradigms”). 
266 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 120, at 2010-11 (noting trend toward managerial judging 
and what that would mean in “mass tort litigation”); Resnik, supra note 53, at 376-77 
(explaining that judges have shifted towards taking more active role, particularly with 
encouraging settlements). 
267 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1808 (2015) 
(noting that tension between party-led norms of discovery and obligations of adversarial 
system led to increased judicial involvement, especially in managerial capacity). 
268 See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 1, at 542-48 (explaining role of judges and parties 
with procedural rules). 
269 See Thompson, supra note 262, at 773-75 (discussing how discovery in civil litigation 
is used more as function of “wear[ing] down the adversary” rather than process of gathering 
information). 
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or rulemakers conclude that private procedural ordering must prevail, such as in 
the forum selection clause cases, they remove discretion entirely, making 
adjudicative adversarialism nigh impossible. 
The standard critiques of the adversarial/inquisitorial binary do not take the 
phenomena of private procedural ordering and judicial discretion together. The 
advantage of looking at these phenomena as related and dynamic is that the co-
management and co-interpretive theories come into focus. While these theories 
show that the challenge to traditional adversarial norms comes not only from the 
fact that the strict view of judges and litigants are too simplistic to account for 
“active” judges and “cooperating” or “contracting” litigants, they do not account 
for the extent to which judges and litigants are bound together in the larger 
project of co-management and co-interpretation. 
The co-management theory shows that the parties and the judge share in the 
project of managing litigation in order to keep such management above the 
adversarial/inquisitorial binary. The figure of the managerial judge has been 
rightly criticized because of the outsized role that the judge plays, a role that can 
look more like an inquisitorial judge.270 But when private procedural ordering is 
added to the mix, the co-managerial role of the litigants tempers the inquisitorial 
blow. Notice that it does not make things more adversarial, but it does explain 
how a move to a managerial approach to litigation can exist outside of both 
adversarial and inquisitorial norms. 
Similarly, the agreement-based foundation of private procedural ordering 
looks decidedly non-adversarial. Rather than producing clashing materials and 
arguments through a system of fixed rules and before a neutral and passive 
adjudicator, the parties generate materials (through co-management) and even 
legal rules (through co-interpretation) via a collaborative process. This is not to 
say it is an uncontentious process, but it is also not an adversarial environment. 
This, however, does not mean that the respect for and encouragement of private 
procedural ordering is a move away from adversarialism. This is because, as this 
Article has shown, private procedural ordering is often tied to the deployment of 
judicial discretion and judicial intervention. Rulemakers and judges use broader 
and narrower scopes of judicial discretion to signal when judges should depart 
from private procedural ordering (for example, using broad discretion to be very 
deferential to class action settlements), and move toward more adversarial 
stances (for example, rejecting a class action settlement). As the litigation 
landscape has moved further away from a system that results in trials,271 co-
management and co-interpretation are phenomena that allow parties to cooperate 
while preserving the basics of adversarial litigation, and allow judges to manage 
litigation without tipping into full scale inquisitorial practices. 
 
270 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
271 See Glover, supra note 112, at 1723 (noticing that most cases end in settlement, 
especially class actions); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 
93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (2007) (arguing that use of summary judgment is one reason for 
“dramatic decline in the number of jury trials in civil cases in the federal courts”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Discussions of the merits and scope of private procedural ordering and 
judicial discretion have dominated recent procedural scholarship and with good 
reason—they both strike at the heart of questions about the power to author the 
rules governing dispute resolution and the relative powers of the players within 
that process. The analysis in this Article demonstrates the range of dynamic 
interactions between the two concepts and also shows that both litigation 
management and rule interpretation must be viewed in a more holistic manner. 
A focus exclusively on judicial behavior and opinions misses much of what 
parties contribute to management and interpretation, while a focus exclusively 
on privatized procedure obscures a larger judicial role in that process as well. 
Co-management and co-interpretation are but first steps in recognizing the 
dynamics of this process, and towards making normative evaluations of these 
practices themselves. 
